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INTRODUCTION 
This Article makes a very specific and concrete proposal: it argues 
that courts should adjust the scope of copyright protection to account 
for the passage of time by expressly considering time as a factor in fair 
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use analysis. 1 More specifically, this Article argues that the older a 
copyrighted work is, the greater the scope of fair use should be - that 
is, the greater the ability of others to re-use, critique, transform, and 
adapt the copyrighted work without permission of the copyright 
owner. Conversely, the newer the work, the narrower the scope of fair 
use. Or, even more concretely, this Article argues that fair use should 
be greater for Mickey Mouse2 than for Harry Potter.3 
Up to now, most of the debate over the role of time in copyright 
law has focused on copyright duration and the controversial issue of 
copyright term extension.4 Since passage of the first Copyright Act in 
1790, Congress has dramatically extended the copyright term from an 
original maximum term of twenty-eight years to the current term of 
seventy years after the death of the author.5 Congress's most recent 
extension of the term in 19986 touched off a fierce debate over both 
the propriety and constitutionality of this extension. Those supporting 
the extension have argued, inter alia, that a longer term encourages 
creative activity, that it is necessary to provide incentives to preserve 
copyrighted works in the digital age, and that it is necessary to harmo­
nize our copyright laws with those of other countries.7 Those opposing 
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . .  is not an in­
fringement of copyright."). 
2. Mickey Mouse first appeared in 1928 in a short animated film, under the name 
Steamboat Willie. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928). 
3. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1998). 
4. See, e.g. , Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002); ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT 
DURATION: DURATION, TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF 
COPYRIGHT POLICY (1999) [hereinafter BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION]; 
Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Copyright Duration at the Millennium, 47 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 13 (2000) [hereinafter Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium];  Hon. 
Hank Brown & David Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Sapping American Creativity, 44 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 94 (1996); Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of 
Copyright in the United States and European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM 
lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579 (1996); Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Ex­
tension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United 
States, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 525 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension 
and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14  CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996); Peter Jaszi, 
Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); William F. Patry, The Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread From Authors, 
14  CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996); J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and 
the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996); Jenny L. Dixon, 
Note, The Copyright Term Extension Act: ls Life Plus Seventy Too Much?, 18 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945 (1996); Joseph A. Lavigne, Comment, For Limited Times? Making 
Rich Kids Richer Via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
311 (1996). 
5. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 4.7, at 4:138 (Supp. 2001). 
6. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04. · 
7. See, e.g., Hon. Howard Coble, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property, 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269, 296 (1998); Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Ap-
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the extension have argued that it effectively provides no additional in­
centive for creative activity,8 that it harms the public by depriving it of 
free access to works, and that it may well be unconstitutional.9 
By focusing so narrowly on the end of the copyright term, how­
ever, this debate has neglected the-Significant issue of how time should 
affect the scope of copyright protection during the copyright term. 
That is, whether or not the most recent extension is justified or consti­
tutional, the fact remains that the copyright term is extremely long. 
Until now, courts and commentators have generally assumed that the 
scope of protection during this long term is constant or unaffected, at 
least directly, by the passage of time. Perhaps this assumption made 
sense when the copyright term was a short twenty-eight years, but 
does it still hold when the term of protection can span an entire cen­
tury? Are the policies and justifications underlying copyright law 
really unaltered by the passage of time? What implications might 
there be for the appropriate scope of copyright protection? Up to 
now, these questions have been left largely unaddressed. 
In this Article, I will argue that extremely strong justifications exist 
for considering time expressly in setting the scope of copyright protec­
tion, and that fair use provides an ideal vehicle, both doctrinally and 
theoretically, for such consideration.10 Indeed, an examination of the 
proach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 U. PITI. L. REV. 719, 736 
(1998); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Boon for the American Creators and the 
American Economy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 319, 325 (1997). See infra Section I.A 
for a fuller articulation of these arguments. 
8. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code With Respect to the Duration 
of Copyright, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(written testimony of Dennis S. Karjala representing United States copyright and intellectual 
property law professors), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/writtest.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002); Hearing on 
S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (oral testimony of Peter 
Jaszi, Professor of Law, American University), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/ 
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/jazsi95.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2002); BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4. See infra Section I.A 
for a fuller articulation of these arguments. 
9. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: 
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1119 (concluding that the term extension likely exceeded implied limits on Congressional 
authority imposed by the Copyright Clause); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amend­
ment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within 
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (applying intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny to term extension and finding that term extension fails). For a more 
comprehensive list of articles on the constitutionality of the term extension, see infra note 
90. 
10. A more limited version of this proposal has been advanced in Note, Gone With the 
Wind Done Gone: "Re-Writing" and Fair Use, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (2002). In that Note, 
the author analyzes the specific problem of "re-writing" of existing creative works and sug­
gests that courts, inter alia, take into account the age of the work when deciding such cases. 
See id. at 1211 n.115 ("The proposal put forth here is limited to re-writings . . . .  "). In this 
Article, I advance the broader claim that courts should consider time as part of fair use 
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theoretical justifications· underlying copyright law reveals that the 
strength and impact of these justifications are quite directly affected 
by the passage of time. As I will show, over the course of the copyright 
term, the impact of protection on copyright incentives wanes, as does 
an author's moral claim to the fruits of his or her labor. At the same 
time, the societal interest in ensuring widespread access to works and 
in encouraging re.-use and adaptation of copyrighted works increases. 
By considering time in fair use analysis, courts can adjust the scope of 
copyright protection to respond more dynamically to these changes in 
copyright interests over the length of the copyright term. 
Furthermore; such a result could be achieved quite easily within 
existing copyright case law. Unlike constitutional challenges to term 
extension, 1 1  this result would not require courts to stretch the doctrine 
or strike down any statutes. Indeed, existing doctrine provides ample 
support for consideration of time as a factor in fair use analysis. The 
Copyright Act and its legislative history expressly authorize courts to 
consider additional factors in fair use analysis, and courts have used 
this authorization to consider a wide range of additional factors not 
expressly mentioned in the statute.12 Given the strong theoretical ar­
guments for considering time, courts should feel quite comfortable in­
corporating this inquiry into fair use analysis. Consideration of time 
would thus be a modest doctrinal change that could have significant 
benefits. 
Finally, the proposal advanced in this Article would provide courts 
with a legitimate way to inject much-needed public-regarding values 
into the scope of copyright protection. One of the concerns underlying 
the debate over copyright term extension is the extent to which this 
extension, like all prior extensions, resulted from a structural imbal­
ance in lobbying power.13 While the benefits of term extension accrue 
to a few, highly-focused and well-organized interests, the costs of ex­
tension, though significant in the aggregate, are more widely distrib­
uted among the population at large. Term extensions are thus difficult 
to oppose, as public choice theory predicts. Indeed, this imbalance has 
been reflected not only in the struggle over term extension, but also in 
analysis generally, and seek to ground this broader claim more comprehensively in existing 
copyright theory. 
Justin Hughes also advances a similar proposal in a forthcoming article. Justin Hughes, 
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Hughes, Fair Use]. 
Although the broad outline of Hughes's proposal is similar to the one !idvanced in this 
Article (in that both call for some consideration of time in fair use analysis), the theoretical 
justifications for Hughes's proposal and the specifics of its implementation are quite differ­
ent. Id. 
11.  Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002). 
12 See infra Section III.A. 
13. See infra Section 11.D. 
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other Congressional expansions of copyright protection. For those 
concerned about this structural imbalance, this Article provides a 
mechanism for courts to legitimately incorporate public-regarding val­
ues into the scope of copyright protection. Even for those who are not 
concerned, however, the general policy justifications underlying copy­
right law provide strong support for this proposal. 
The rest of this Article explains the proposal in more detail and 
builds the case in support of it. Part I provides the context for the pro­
posal, describing the debate over term extension and the arguments on 
both sides of the issue. It then briefly sketches out the proposal and 
explains how it relates to this wider debate. Part II then examines the 
theoretical argument in support of the proposal, concluding that it 
finds extremely strong support under several different theories un­
derlying copyright law. I start with the policy arguments, rather than 
the doctrine, because these arguments provide the impetus for the 
proposal. Part III then builds the doctrinal case for the proposal, ex­
amining the doctrine, case law, and legislative history for support. The 
conclusion I reach is that the copyright act clearly authorizes courts to 
consider time in their fair use analysis, and that, given the strong pol­
icy reasons supporting such a consideration, they should do so. Part IV 
then returns to the proposal and fleshes it out by applying it to a num­
ber of examples and showing how the proposal would have many con­
crete benefits. Part IV concludes by addressing a number of antici­
pated objections. 
I. THE PROPOSAL IN CONTEXT 
A. The Debate over Term Extension 
For the next sixteen years, not a single, published, copyrighted 
work in the United States will pass into the public domain. That is, 
from now until December 31, 2018,14 not one published, copyrighted 
work will have its term of copyright protection expire.15 This is be­
cause Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act16 in 1998, extending the term of copyright protection by an addi­
tional twenty years. For works authored by individuals, the term now 
extends until seventy years after the death of the author;17 for works 
14. On this date, works that were copyrighted in 1923 will pass into the public domain. 
The Copyright Act provides that works whose terms would technically expire during the 
year retain copyrighted status until the end of that calendar year. 17 U .S.C. § 305 (2000). 
15. Note the qualification "published." Certain previously unpublished works, which 
were brought under copyright protection under § 303 of the 1976 Act, will enter the public 
domain on January 1, 2003, unless they are published before that date, in which case they 
will be protected until 2047. See § 303(a). 
16. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04. 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
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"authored" by corporate entities,18 the term is now ninety-five years 
from the date of publication or 120 years after creation, whichever ex­
pires first.19 Not only does this apply to future works, but Congress 
also made this extension retroactive, applying it to all existing works 
still under copyright protection at the time the extension went into ef­
fect.20 As a result of this retroactive extension, no published works will 
pass into the public domain for twenty years after the Act went into 
effect. 
The impact of this extension on copyright markets is significant. 
Until passage of the extension, copyrighted works had been passing 
into the public domain at a steady pace. In 1998, for example, T.S. 
Eliot's The Waste Land,21 James Joyce's Ulysses,22 and the movie 
Blood and Sand23 with Rudolph Valentino all passed into the public 
domain.24 In 1996 and 1997, F. Scott Fitzgerald's This Side of 
Paradise,25 D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love,26 Edith Wharton's The 
Age of Innocence,27 and the song Over There by George M. Cohan28 all 
passed into the public domain.29 What this meant was that these works 
could now be freely copied, distributed, and built upon by others. So if 
you wanted to print and sell copies of The Waste Land, you could 
freely do so without seeking a license from, or paying a royalty to, the 
copyright owner. Similarly, if you wanted to write and sell your own 
sequel of This Side of Paradise, or make a movie out of The Age of 
Innocence, you could do so. All of these uses were now freely permit­
ted once the term of copyright protection ended. 
18. Or, more precisely, works "made for hire"; the Copyright statute considers the em­
ployer to be the "author" of works made by an employee or independent contractor under 
some circumstances. See § 302(c). Anonymous and pseudonymous works also share this 
same term. Id. 
· 
19. Id. 
20. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. § 302-304. 
21. T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND (1922). 
22. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (1922). But see Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism 
and Its Discontents: The Case of James Joyce's Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633 (1998) 
(suggesting that Ulysses in fact passed into the public domain long ago as a result of failure 
to comply with certain requirements). 
23. BLOOD AND SAND (1922). 
24. These examples and many others can be found at Dennis Karjala's excellent web 
site, Opposing Copyright Extension, at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtension (last visited June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Karjala, Website]. 
25. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE (1920). 
26. 0.H. LAWRENCE, WOMEN IN LOVE (1920). 
27. EDITH WHARTON, THE AGE OF INNOCENCE (1920). 
28. George M. Cohan, Over There (1920). 
29. See Karjala, supra note 24. 
November 2002) Copyright and Time 415 
The fact that these works passed into the public domain was no ac­
cident. Rather, it was an essential part' of the design of copyright law.30 
The basic idea behind copyright law is that an author gets a certain 
number of years during which he or she can prevent unauthorized 
copying and distribution of the creative work. This exclusive period 
permits the copyright owner to exploit the work and obtain a return 
for his or her creative labor, thus providing ·an incentive to engage in 
the labor in the first place. This period of exclusive control is limited, 
however. The Constitution expressly authorizes copyright protection 
only for "limited Times,"31 and the Copyright Act places precisely such 
a limit on the duration of copyright.32 The idea behind the limited 
grant is that, after an author has been sufficiently compensated33 for · 
his or her creative labor, the work should pass into the public domain 
so that all of society can use it freely, so that it can be disseminated 
more broadly, and so that its expressive elements can be appropriated 
and built upon.34 This reflects the balance struck by copyright law be­
tween providing incentives for creation and promoting wide dissemi­
nation of the fruits of this creation. 
Because of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,35 
however, many copyrighted works that were scheduled to pass into the 
public domain in the years from 1998 through 2018 will now remain 
copyrighted for an additional twenty years. Among these works are 
Disney's original Mickey Mouse36 (originally scheduled to expire in 
30. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) ("The copyright term is limited 
so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors."); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("[Copyright] is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, 
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of ex­
clusive control has expired."); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LA w & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, 171; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex­
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also Melville B. Nimmer, 
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 
UCLA L. REV. 1 180, 1193 (1970). 
32. 17 u.s.c. § 302 (2000). 
33. Not surprisingly, there is much difference of opinion over what is "sufficient." See 
infra Section II.A. 
34. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 30; David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1416 (1995) ("[W]orks are relegated to the public domain to be­
come the heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a temporary way station to reward 
authors on the road to that greater good."). 
35. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium, " 
23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 170 (1999). 
36. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928). Pluto would have gone into the public 
domain in 2006, and Goofy in 2008. Similarly, the copyright in A.A. Milne's Winnie the 
Pooh, which Disney had just recently acquired, was also scheduled to fall into the public 
domain. See Jon Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Conver-
416 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:409 
2003),37 George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue (originally scheduled to 
expire in 1999),38 numerous works by Cole Porter, Irving Berlin, 
Hoagy Carmichael, Ernest Hemingway, and William Faulkner,39 as 
well as thousands of other books, articles, movies, songs, photographs, 
and artworks from the artistically productive 1920s and 30s.40 The 
owners of these copyrights will now be able to license and receive 
revenue from those copyrights for an additional twenty years. The 
public, conversely, will now have to wait an additional twenty years for 
these and all other works still under copyright to pass into the public 
domain. 
This extension was merely the latest in a long line of congressional 
extensions of the copyright term. The term of protection under the 
original 1790 Act was fourteen years, with the possibility of renewal 
for another fourteen-year term, resulting in a potential total of twenty­
eight years.41 The maximum possible term was lengthened in 1831 to 
forty-two years,42 then in 1909 to fifty-six years.43 And then, beginning 
in 1962, Congress embarked on a steady course of incremental exten­
sions - nine separate times within twelve years44 - which expanded 
the maximum term from fifty-six to seventy years for subsisting 
gence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 523 (1999); Hannibal 
Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the 
First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L:J. 777, 828 (2000). 
37. See Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 17, 1998, at 22. 
38. See John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2; Dennis 
Karjala, Value of the Public Domain, at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtension/publicdomain/Pdlist.html (last visited June 6, 2002). 
39. See Karjala, supra note 38; Teresa Ou, From Wheaton v. Peters to Eldred v. Reno: 
An Originalist Interpretation of the Copyright Clause, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
eldredvreno/OuEldred.pdf (last visited June 6, 2002). 
40. See Carl S. Kaplan, Free Book Sites Hurt by Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES ON THE 
WEB, Oct. 30, 1998, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/cyberlaw/30law.html 
(last visited June 6, 2002) (quoting Michael Hart, director of the Gutenberg Project, esti­
mating that the extension "will essentially prevent about one million books from entering 
the public domain over the next 20 years."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Congress's Copy­
right Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19; E. Scott Johnson, Law Gives Copyrights 
New Life, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at Cl2 (listing works that would have gone into the pub­
lic domain, but for the extension); Joyce Slaton, A Mickey Mouse Copyright Law?, WIRED, 
Jan. 13, 1999, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17327,00.html. 
41. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.7, 
at 4:138. 
42. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37 (1831). 
43. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909) (repealed 1978). 
44. Pub. L. No. 87-668 (1962) (59 years); Pub. L. No. 89-142 (1965) (61 years); Pub. L. 
No. 90-141 (1967) (62 years); Pub. L. No. 90-416 (1968) (63 years); Pub. L. No. 91-147 (1969) 
(64 years); Pub. L. No. 91-555 (1970) (65 years); Pub. L. No. 92-170 (1971) (66 years); Pub. L. 
No. 92-566 (1972) (68 years); Pub. L. No. 93-573 (1974) (70 years). 
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works.45 In the substantial revision of the Act in 1976, Congress ex­
tended the maximum possible term for existing works to seventy-five 
years.46 For future works, a new way of calculating the term replaced 
the prior fixed term: all future works would be protected for the life of 
the author plus fifty years.47 This change in the calculation of the term 
resulted in a dramatic extension of the copyright term.48 For example, 
a work created by an author in his thirties would have a copyright 
term of more than ninety years from publication, if the author lived to 
at least seventy. Finally, the latest extension occurred in 1998, when 
Congress passed the Bono Act and extended the copyright term to the 
life of the author plus seventy years.49 
Many of these extensions50 came under heavy attack from various 
academics and public interest groups, and the Bono Act was no excep­
tion.51 With respect to the extension for future works, commentators 
pointed out that any additional revenue created by an additional 
twenty years of protection more than fifty years after the death of the 
author was unlikely to lead to any appreciable increase in creative ef­
fort or activity, given the long period of time over which any revenues 
would have to be discounted.52 And even if some minimal degree of 
45. These extensions were made in anticipation of the substantial 1976 revision of the 
Act. 
46. Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976) (75 years) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)). 
47. 17 u.s.c. § 302 (1994). 
48. See generally Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory 
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 781 (2001). 
49. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. § 302-304. 
SO. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 323 (1970) (detailing the 
doubtful case for extension of the pre-1976 Act term); Ralph S. Brown, Copyright and Its 
Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 301, 
302 (1986). 
51. See generally Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors 
in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 Submitted to the Committees on the 
Judiciary, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong. {1998) (written 
testimony of Dennis Karjala), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtensionllegmats/1998Statement.html (last visited July 25, 2002) 
(hereinafter Karjala, Statement]; Bell, supra note 48; Christina N. Gifford, Note, The Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363 (2000); Karjala, Website, 
supra note 24 (collecting materials submitted in opposition to term �xtension):Many of the 
arguments made both in support of, and against, the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act were made a few years earlier, in the debate over the proposed 1995 Copyright Term 
Extension Act, which was not enacted. See The Copyright Term Extension Act, Hearings on 
S. 483 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Hearin,gs on H.R. 
989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judi­
ciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Brownlee, supra note 4; Bryce, supra note 4; Hamilton, 
supra note 4; Jaszi, supra note 4; Patry, supra note 4; Reichman, supra note 4; Dixon, supra 
note 4; Lavigne, supra note 4. Because the two acts are so close in time and involved essen­
tially the· same arguments and opposing parties, I will treat arguments raised in both in­
stances largely interchangeably. 
52. See, e.g., Karjala, Statement, supra note 51. 
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incentive did exist for future works, such an added incentive could not 
be used to justify extension of the term for works that had already been 
created. That is, the works already exist, so the additional protection 
could not possibly have any impact on incentives to create them.53 
Opponents of term extension also argued that the extension would 
impose substantial costs on the public by depriving it of freer access to 
copyrighted works.54 In the wake of the Bono Act, the public must 
now wait another twenty years before obtaining such access, even for 
works that had already been created.55 During this period, the public 
will continue to pay higher prices for those works.56 In addition, 
authors who wish to use such works as the basis for new creative 
works must expend effort and funds to license such uses from the 
copyright owners for an additional twenty years.57 Thus, to many op­
ponents of term extension, the Act represented little more than a 
transfer of wealth from the public to existing copyright owners.58 
Those supporting term extension responded by offering additional 
justifications for the extension, separate and apart from the incentive 
rationale set forth above.59 One justification was that incentives were 
needed to convert nondigital works into digital form and to preserve 
the digital copies given their fragile nature. That is, without additional 
years to exploit the work, no one would invest the effort necessary to 
53. See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimi­
nation and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2036 (2000) ("Can you 
really explain the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act economically, perhaps as an 
attempt to offer incentives to the dead?"); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 171 ("(I]t is important 
to emphasize that the traditional justification of copyright protection, as an incentive to the 
creation of works of authorship, simply does not apply to extension of the term of pre­
existing works."); Travis, supra note 36, at 817-18. But see Hatch, supra note 7, at 736 (argu­
ing that incentive impact results from the fact that existing authors, by receiving more reve­
nue, are free to engage in other creative activities). But see Karjala, Statement, supra note 51 
(debunking Hatch argument). 
54. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 57-76 (dis­
puting claim that extension is "costless"); Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 11 (docu­
menting the various costs). 
55. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51. 
56. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1170 (2002) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Economists' Brief]; 
Karjala, Statement, supra note 51 (refuting claim that public domain status has no impact on 
prices); BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 64-65 (same). 
57. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 171 (arguing that retroactive extension "cannot en­
hance the quantum of creativity from the past, but it can compromise the creativity of the 
future, by delaying for twenty years the time at which subsequent authors may freely build 
on these works"). 
58. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 5; Patry, supra note 4 (criticizing earlier bills 
that would have extended the term). 
59. See generally Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual 
Prop. of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 355-56 (1996) (statements of Bruce 
Lehman and Marybeth Peters); Coble, supra note 7, at 296; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728; 
Miller, supra note 7, at 325. 
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preserve and digitize copyrighted works.6() A related argument, appli­
cable to both digital and non-digital works, was that additional copy­
right protection was necessary to provide incentives for continuing dis­
tribution and promotion of existing works.61 
Yet another justification, and the one that ultimately appeared 
most persuasive to Congress,62 was based on the need to maintain a 
positive trade surplus by harmonizing the copyright term with the 
terms of European countries.63 The European Community ("EC") had 
instituted a rule that provided foreign works protection for the shorter 
of the EC term or the domestic term for the foreign country.64 Since 
the term for many works in European countries is life plus seventy 
years, many U.S. works under the earlier term would obtain twenty 
years less protection in Europe. U.S. companies would thus, the argu­
ment went, be operating under a disadvantage. This would have an un­
favorable impact on our balance of trade, since the United States is a 
net exporter of copyrighted works. 
Opponents of term extension countered by arguing that these ad­
ditional justifications were extremely weak and certainly not sufficient 
to outweigh the substantial costs imposed by term extension. First, 
opponents of term extension pointed out that there was no indication 
or evidence that the existing copyright term was insufficient to provide 
the incentives needed to digitize and preserve copyrighted works, or 
60. See Coble, supra note 7, at 296; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728; Miller, supra note 7, at 
325. Proponents of the extension also argued that the extension was warranted due to the 
desire to provide a return for an author's descendants and increasing life expectancy. See 
Hatch, supra note 7, at 732. But see BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra 
note 4, at 145-47; William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting 
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 931 (1997) [hereinafter Patry, Failure] (arguing 
that this argument is "internally contradictory. While it is true that a longer lifespan means 
that grandchildren of the author will live longer, it also means that the author will live longer 
and, therefore, will be able to provide for his or her grandchildren for an equally longer pe­
riod"). 
61. See, e.g., Hearing Held on Possible Extension of Copyright Term, 46 PAT. & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at 467 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 
154, 2002) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319321 (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) (ar­
guing that incentives may be necessary to commercialize works even after they have been 
created). 
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452 (1998), 1998 WL 120160; see also S. REP. No. 104-315 
(1996), 1996 WL 397400 (report on an earlier, unpassed term extension bill). 
63. See 105 CONG. REC. Sll,672-74, 794-96, H9949-54 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998); CONG. 
REC. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998); The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on 
S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20, 23 (1995) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright); Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright 
Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 690, 700 
(2000) (statements by Arthur R. Miller and Jane C. Ginsburg); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 
171; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728-30. 
64. Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L290) 9. 
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that extending protection would increase such incentives.65 Indeed, 
there was evidence suggesting just the opposite, that is, that continued 
protection of works would in fact hinder such preservation efforts.66 
Specifically, a number of entities had been engaged in digitizing and 
making available on the Internet copies of works that had passed into 
the public domain.67 By extending the term of protection, Congress 
significantly hindered these ongoing attempts to digitize existing 
works. Similarly, commentators questioned whether incentives were 
necessary to ensure continuing distribution of already existing works, 
particularly since such incentives are generally not necessary in other 
non-copyright markets.68 
Opponents also questioned the desirability of harmonization with 
the terms of European countries and argued that, even if harmoniza­
tion were desirable, the Bono Act did not in fact address the issue.69 
As an initial matter, opponents argued that harmonization in the 
abstract was not a satisfactory reason in itself without some under­
standing of the costs and benefits of harmonization.70 Moreover, the 
extension would not in fact truly harmonize protection, since other 
term71 and non-term features of European copyright protection 
65. See Travis, supra note 36, at 830 ("The wide availability of the works of Shakespeare 
demonstrates that public domain works need not fall into obscurity."). 
66. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive Filed on Behalf of Petitioners, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002) (No. 01-618), available at http://eon.law.harvard. 
edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cert/archive-amicus.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) (arguing 
that extension will in fact prevent attempts to digitally preserve certain older, copyrighted 
works). 
67. See id. 
68. BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 66 ("One of the 
errors in this line of thinking is the assumption that the same policy imperative that applies 
at the time of initial creation and dissemination also applies at later times . . . .  [O]nce the 
work has been created and a time sufficient to recoup investment has passed, there is no 
more reason to assume a call for monopoly profits or subsidy here than with any other prod­
uct."). Blll see Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (suggesting 
reasons why copyright markets might be different). 
69. See generally BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 
191-214. 
70. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT 
DURATION, supra note 4; Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: 
Property Rights or Cultural Progress?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 135-38 (1998) 
(critically analyzing congressional reliance on harmonization as a rationale for changes to 
the copyright act); Jaszi, supra note 4, at 304; Patry, Failure, supra note 60, at 930 (arguing 
that harmonization-based arguments for term extension are "entirely post hoc"); Reichman, 
supra note 4, at 626, 639 (arguing that the proposed 1995 extension "cannot be justified in 
terms of a drive for harmonization as such"); Jerome Epping, Jr., Comment, Harmonizing 
the United States and Eutopean Community Copyright Terms: Needed Adjustment or Money 
for Nothing?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 183 (1996) (analyzing the extent to which term extension 
would in fact harmonize protection). 
71. Indeed, for certain categories of works such as sound recordings and works created 
by corporate entities, the extended U.S. term would provide more protection than that given 
to similar works in Europe. See, e.g., Patry, Failure, supra note 60, at 928-30. For example, 
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regimes result in substantial differences in the treatment of copy­
righted works, and these differences greatly outweigh the impact of 
the copyright term.72 Finally, even if the Act did harmonize the scope 
of protection, there was no evidence that lack of harmonization would 
have any impact whatsoever on the U.S. trade balance.73 
In the end, Congress passed the term extension, despite the fact 
that the substantive policy arguments supporting term extension were 
not terribly compelling.74 Although prospective extension of the term 
could theoretically provide some minimal degree of additional incen­
tive for creative activity, in practice, the added incentive is trivial. 
Moreover, retroactive extension can find no reasonable incentive­
based justification. And the alternative justifications proffered by 
Congress, though facially plausible, were extremely weak, particularly 
in light of the costs imposed by the extension. Indeed, the weakness of 
the arguments in support of term extension is reflected in the fact that 
the extension was opposed by an unusually wide array of copyright 
scholars, including many who normally favor broader protection.75 
Given the lack of strong policy support for term extension, 
Congress's passage of the Bono Act can ultimately best be understood 
as resulting, in large part, from the lobbying efforts of the copyright 
industries (for example, film, music, publishing, software) which had 
much to gain from an extension, particularly a retroactive one. Com­
panies, such as Disney, with valuable copyrights that were slated to 
expire within the next twenty years lobbied aggressively for the exten­
sion.76 These companies had much to gain from retroactive extension 
of their copyrights, since extension permitted them to protect and ex-
the European countries that recognize corporate authorship give such authors a term of 70 
years, while the Bono Act gives similar authors a term of 95 years. See Karjala, Statement, 
supra note 51 (providing many other examples where the Bono Act would result in different 
terms of protection). 
72. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; Netanel, supra note 9, at 74-75; see also 
Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 172-73. 
73. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51. 
74. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium, supra note 4, at 61 ("What is striking about the 
arguments offered by proponents of a lengthened copyright term is their lack of substance. 
Virtually none of the reasons put forth for change have even a modicum of intellectual 
merit."). 
75. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51 (listing signatories); Symposium, supra note 63, 
at 698-702 (statement by Jane Ginsburg). 
76. See Garon, supra note 36, at 523; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solici­
tude: Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236-37 (2000) (noting that 
the copyright term extension "was the Walt Disney Company's 'highest priority' in the 1998 
legislative session of Congress"); Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The 
Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); Disney 
Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI . TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22. 
The descendants of George Gershwin and other famous songwriters also lobbied heavily for 
the extension. See John J. Fialka, Songwriters' Heirs Mourn Copyright Loss, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 30, 1997, at Bl. 
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ploit their copyrights for an additional twenty years. At the same time, 
the public interest groups and commentators who opposed the exten­
sion had no similar lobbying power.77 And certainly the public at large 
was not sufficiently exetdsed about a topic as abstract as copyright 
term extension to exert any meaningful pressure on Congress to resist 
industry calls for extension. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that the 
extension was passed, despite the lack of strong policy justifications in 
its support. 
B.  Initial Responses to Term Extension 
Concerned about the negative effects of copyright term extension 
and Congress's apparent inability to resist calls for expansion from the 
copyright industries, opponents of term extension turned to constitu­
tional challenges. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,78 a number of parties brought 
a declaratory judgment action arguing, among other things, that 
Congress had exceeded the scope of the grant in the Constitution's 
Copyright Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the retroac­
tive application of the extension did not "promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts," since there could be no justification for 
trying to increase incentives for existing works. Moreover, Congress's 
repeated prospective extensions violated the "limited Times" language 
of the Copyright Clause by effectively extending the term indefi­
nitely.79 Plaintiffs also argued that the term extension violated the First 
Amendment. 80 
The plaintiffs lost both before the D.C. District Court81 and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.82 The majority opinion for 
the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the argument that Congress had ex­
ceeded the scope of the Constitution's Copyright Clause by extending 
the term retroactively. The Court refused to construe the preamble of 
the Copyright Clause - "To promote the Progress of Science and use­
ful Arts" - as a substantive limitation on Congress's power.83 More­
over, even if the preamble were a substantive limit, the court said the 
77. See BARO & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4. 
78. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002). I should disclose that I signed an amicus brief in Eldred, 
arguing that the retroactive portions of the term extension act are unconstitutional. Brief of 
Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002) (No. 01-618). 
· 
79. See jd. The plaintiffs also initially argued that retroactive extension violated the 
Copyright Clause's originality requirement. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
83. See id. at 377-78. 
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government's proffered justifications (that is, a need to provide incen­
tives to preserve existing works, the need to harmonize the U.S. copy­
right term with European terms, the need to preserve the United 
States' balance of trade) were sufficient to "promote Progress" when 
evaluated with proper deference to Congress's judgment.84 The Court 
rejected additional arguments based on the First Amendment, holding 
that the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law and the existence 
of a fair use defense were sufficient to protect any First Amendment 
interests implicated by the extension.85 In dissent, Judge Sentelle ar­
gued that Congress had exceeded the scope of its authority under the 
Copyright Clause because the extension did not "promote the Prog­
ress of Science and useful Arts,"86 and because the continual succes­
sion of extensions violated the "limited Times"· language of the clause. 
The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc87 (over 
a two-judge dissent88). The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, which the Court granted.89 The case was heard by 
the Supreme Court on October 9, 2002, and an opinion has yet to be 
issued, as of the date of this writing. 
The arguments raised in Eldred echoed similar arguments found in 
the academic literature.00 Indeed the copyright term extension, along 
84. See id. at 378-79. 
85. See id. at 376. 
86. See id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part) ("The government has offered no ten­
able theory as to how retrospective extension can promote the useful arts."). 
87. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001) · 
88. See id. at 855 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part) (joined by Tatel, J.) ("Once a work is 
published, however, extending the copyright term does absolutely nothing to induce further 
creative activity by the author - and how could it? The work is already published. "), cert. 
granted, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002). 
89. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002). 
90. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 
U.S.A. 1 (1987); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, 
and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001); Oscar Cargill & Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Dura­
tion v. the Constitution, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 917 (1971); Symposium, supra note 63; Michael 
H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I Stayed Too Long?", 52 FLA. L. 
REV. 989 (2000); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations 
on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and 
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Heald & Sherry, supra note 9 (con­
cluding that the term extension likely exceeded implied limits on Congressional authority 
imposed by the Copyright Clause); Mark Lemley, The Constitutiona/ization of Technology 
Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 539 n.9 (2000) (listing articles); Lessig, supra note 9; 
Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76; Netanel, supra note 9 (applying intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny to term extension and finding that term extension fails); Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Tyler Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extensions 
and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 19 (2001); L. 
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinaf­
ter Patterson, Free Speech]; L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 365 (2000) [hereinafter Patterson, Understanding]; Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual 
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with a number of other recent legislative expansions of copyright pro­
tection, have spawned a rich literature examining the potential limits 
on Congress's power to expand copyright protection. Some commen­
tators have argued that recent Congressional expansions, particularly 
the retroactive extension of the copyright term, violate internal limits 
imposed by the Constitution's intellectual property clause.91 Others 
have argued that such expansions may violate external limits imposed 
by the First Amendment.92 In all, a generous amount of scholarship 
has been produced analyzing the term extension, much of it conclud­
ing that the extension, at least the retroactive aspect of it, is constitu­
tionally problematic. 
There are limits, however, on the extent to which constitutional 
arguments can effectively address the many issues raised by term ex­
tension and the long period of copyright protection more generally. 
True, some of these constitutional arguments are reasonably strong. 
For example, the argument against retroactive term extension quite 
possibly could be adopted by the Supreme Court in Eldred.93 The 
constitutional case against prospective extension of the copyright 
term, however, is far weaker.94 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court 
were to strike down both the retrospective and prospective aspects of 
the most recent term extension, it would still leave intact the ex­
tremely long existing term of copyright protection.95 
Thus, regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately decides the 
constitutional issue, many of the effects of a lengthy term will still be 
Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000) (charting the history behind the Intellec­
tual Property clause); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); 
see also Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the 
Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming fall 2002), available at http://llr.lls.edu. 
91. See, e.g. , Heald & Sherry, supra note 9; Patterson, Understanding, supra note 90; 
Walterscheid, supra note 90. 
92. See, e.g. , Benkler, supra note 90; Lessig, supra note 9; Netanel, supra note 9. 
93. Another case has also been filed in another circuit, with similar facts. See Golan v. 
Ashcroft, Civ. No. 01-8-1854 (D. Colo. filed 2001), available at http:l/eon.law.harvard.edu/ 
openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.pdf. 
94. Of course, if retroactive extension is ruled unconstitutional, the incentive to lobby 
for future prospective extensions will be effectively eliminated, since those lobbying for such 
extensions are primarily concerned with gaining additional protection for existing copy­
righted works. The benefits from purely prospective term extension are so remote that they 
would not justify the expenditure of any current funds for lobbying purposes. See infra 
Section II.A. This is one of the tactical reasons supporting the retroactive attack in particu­
lar. Elimination of retroactive term extension, however, would not address the current pro­
spective extension nor, more generally, the already-too-long copyright term. 
95. It is true that such a decision might well call into question the constitutionality of 
prior copyright term extensions, and a subsequent lawsuit could well result in a judicial deci­
sion striking down prior extensions. At this point, however, such a situation is rather specu­
lative, particularly given the different context and justifications for prior extensions (for ex­
ample, compliance with the Berne Convention). And either way, the term of copyright 
protection will still be quite long. 
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felt whether or not future extensions are permitted. Direct attacks on 
term extension have little to say about what impact the existing length 
of the term should have on the scope of copyright protection more 
generally. That is, by focusing so narrowly on the end of the copyright 
term, these constitutional arguments do not address the broader ques­
tion of how the passage of time might affect copyright interests during 
the lengthy existing copyright term. A constitutional challenge is thus 
a rather blunt, though important, tool for addressing concerns about 
the length of copyright protection. 
· 
C. The Proposal - An Overview 
Given that direct constitutional challenges to term extension do 
not appear to fully address the issues raised by term extension, and 
given that political pressure on the elected branches is more likely to 
result in a longer rather than shorter copyright term, are there any 
other means within existing doctrine to reduce the ill-effects of the 
term extension? That is, are there less dramatic ways for courts to in­
corporate some of the concerns raised by the opponents of term ex­
tension into the existing structure and doctrine of copyright law? 
I believe that the answer is yes. Indeed, I believe that existing 
copyright law doctrines provide courts with the tools not only to miti­
gate some of the ill-effects of the recent term extension, but also, more 
broadly, to arrive at a much more well-balanced and finely-tuned un­
derstanding of copyright scope, one· that for the first time recognizes 
and takes account of the vast modern expansion of the copyright term 
and its impact on the policies underlying copyright law. Which leads 
me to my proposal. 
The proposal is simple: in deciding whether a given use of a copy­
righted work is fair use,96 courts should take into account how much 
time has passed since the work was created.97 The more recent the 
work, all other things being equal, the narrower the scope of fair use; 
the older the work, the greater the scope of fair use. So, for example, a 
book written seventy years ago should be subject to a greater degree 
of fair use than a book written yesterday. The ability to make sequels, 
to copy portions of the w.ork, to comment upon it, to transform and re­
work it, should be greater than the similar ability to make fair use of a 
book written only two years ago. 
96. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000). 
97. See also BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 139 
n.192 ("The doctrine of fair use, though, may be seen as a device which, on an ad hoc basis, 
can modulate protection so as to bring it closer to the optimum . . . .  "); Hughes, Fair Use, 
supra note 10 (proposing that courts consider how much copyright protection remains, when 
deciding fair use cases); Note, supra note 10, at 1209 (proposing that courts consider both 
time and the size of the author's reward in deciding whether the re-writing of another 
author's literary work constitutes fair use). 
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Courts would implement this proposal rather straightforwardly 
under existing copyright doctrine. The fair use defense in copyright 
law is a flexible defense, designed to ensure that the entitlements 
granted to authors not inadvertently hinder copyright's overall 
purpose of encouraging widespread dissemination of creative 
works. The defense privileges certain uses of copyrighted works for 
purposes of comment, criticism, education, research, and news re­
porting, even if such uses would otherwise be technically infring­
ing.98 In assessing whether a use is fair, courts consider four statu­
tory factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the amount of the original work used, and the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for the work.99 
Under the proposal in this Article, courts would simply consider 
time as an additional factor in fair use analysis. Although the copy­
right act lists only four factors, the text of the statute and its legislative 
history clearly indicate that these factors are not meant to be exclu­
sive.100 Instead, courts are meant to apply fair use in a flexible manner, 
and indeed courts have considered many additional factors in deciding 
fair use cases.101 Consideration of time as an additional factor would 
thus fit rather easily within existing doctrine. For older works, this ad­
ditional factor would weigh in favor of fair use, while for younger 
works this factor would weigh against fair use. There would thus be 
more "breathing space" for others to use, copy, transform, and com­
ment upon older works. 
To be clear, consideration of time in fair use analysis would not be 
dispositive. Nor would the proposal here eliminate copyright protec­
tion for older works. Rather, time would be a factor to be weighed 
along with (and in some cases outweighed by) the other fair use fac­
tors.102 Older works would still enjoy substantial protection under 
copyright law, for example, against direct, commercial copying. How­
ever, older works would have less protection against uses of the work 
that involve traditionally fair uses.103 Thus, Mickey Mouse would still 
have substantial protection against literal commercial copying, even 
though he first appeared more than seventy years ago.104 However, 
98. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000). 
99. Id. 
100. See infra Section III.A. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. I describe this in much more detail (along with concrete examples) infra Section 
IV.A. 
104. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928). 
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Mickey would be exposed to a greater degree of other critical, trans­
formative, and derivative uses.105 
In advancing this proposal, let me be clear about my motives. Like 
many other commentators, I am troubled by the continuing expansion 
of copyright protection on a number of different fronts. Specifically, I 
believe that many of these expansions find little or no support under 
any of the policy justifications underlying copyright law. At the same 
time, the prospect of congressional action in this arena is unlikely, 
given the structural imbalances in lobbying power. And constitutional 
challenges to congressional action are an incomplete solution, even if 
successful. Thus, this proposal is quite consciously an attempt to look 
for ways within existing doctrine for courts to legitimately inject cer­
tain public-regarding values into the scope of copyright protection.106 
For those who share this view, this proposal should be very attractive. 
But even for those who do not share this view, the proposal should 
be attractive since it stands very much on its own two feet. That is, al­
though the proposal in this Article was inspired by the perceived ill­
effects of term extension, it turns out that the proposal has beneficial 
effects and implications for copyright law more generally, beyond the 
narrow issue of term extension. As I will show, the proposal finds very 
strong support under virtually all of the underlying justifications for 
copyright law. It provides a more finely-calibrated balance between 
access and incentives, it encourages an appropriate amount of re-use 
and adaptation of existing works, and it provides more measured 
105. For purposes of simplification, I refer here, and elsewhere, to the characters them­
selves, as opposed to the underlying creative works in which they first appeared. Copyright 
law provides some level of protection for fictional characters that are sufficiently delineated, 
although the precise scope and extent of such protection is not completely clear. See, e.g. , 
D.C. Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.7.2. 
106. This proposal is thus likely what Jane Ginsburg was concerned about in writing 
that: "One unintended consequence of term extension, I fear, is to promote contentions that 
the only way to offset the excessive term of copyright is to cut back on the scope of copyright 
- to establish weaker derivative works protection or weaker protection across the board." 
See Symposium, supra note 63, at 701. Others have suggested more generally that courts 
should interpret fair use expansively in light of extensions in the copyright term. See, e.g. , 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copy­
right Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (1997) ("Under the current scheme of 
copyright, granting ever broader rights to copyright holders for ever longer periods of time, 
the guarantee of the right of fair use must be protected and even expanded."); see also 
Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 
1992, at 185 n.2, 207 (1992); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual 
Property Law: Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING Bus. L.J. 167 (2000) (arguing that courts interpreting intellectual property stat­
utes can play a role in compensating for imperfections in the legislative process); cf 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 114 (1967) ("It is evident that 
as rights are strengthened, they need run, and can be endured, only for a correspondingly 
shorter period."); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 
RAND. J. ECON. 106 (1990) (discussing the interaction of length and breadth of protection in 
the patent context). 
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rewards to author& for their creative labor. These are all good reasons, 
within existing copyright law theory, to support the proposal. Thus, 
whatever one thinks about recent expansions in copyright protection, 
the proposal advanced in this Article will have significant benefits for 
copyright law generally. 
II. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
Before examining the doctrinal argument in support of my pro­
posal, I want to establish the reason to construct it in the first place -
that is, that time should matter in fair use analysis. As it turns out, an 
examination of a number of policy justifications underlying copyright 
law reveals that there is extremely strong support for considering time 
in setting the proper scope of copyright protection. Indeed, the sup­
port is so strong that it is surprising that courts have yet to explicitly 
vary the scope of copyright protection over time, particularly given the 
vast current term of copyright protection. 
A. Incentives and Access 
The primary policy justification for copyright protection in the 
United States is the incentive justification. The familiar argument goes 
like this: copyright protection is necessary to provide adequate incen­
tives for authors to engage in creative activity. Without such protec­
tion, others could easily copy and distribute an author's works, quickly 
driving the price of the work down to the marginal cost of producing 
an additional copy.107 Authors would thus be unable to recoup the 
costs of their original creative labor.108 As a result, authors would not 
choose to engage in such labor in the first place, and creative works 
would not be produced in adequate numbers.109 Copyright law solves 
this problem by providing incentives to engage in creative labor, 
thereby harnessing the economic self-interest of authors to the benefit 
of society at large. 
107. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy­
right Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic 
Analysis]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283 (1996). 
108. But see Breyer, supra note 50 (arguing that this may not be the case in the market 
for books, in light of first-mover advantages and other factors). See also Barry W. Tyerman 
The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor 
Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1981) (disputing Breyer's claims). See generally BARD & 
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 26 n.32 (discussing non-monetary 
incentives more generally). 
109. The term "adequate" here is deliberately fuzzy, as much disagreement exists over 
what is adequate. 
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At first blush, the incentive argument would appear to justify fur­
ther extension of the copyright term.11° After all, if some incentive is 
good, why isn't more incentive even better? The familiar answer is 
that protection comes at a cost. Copyright law provides incentives to 
authors, but only by enabling authors to restrict dissemination of the 
work.111 In economic terms, copyright law permits an author to raise 
the price of the work above the marginal cost of producing an addi­
tional copy. This provides an incentive to the author, but it also means 
that those who would have purchased the copy at or above the mar­
ginal cost but below the higher price cannot get access to the work.112 
Copyright law thus presents a trade-off. 1 13 Roughly speaking, depend­
ing on the strength of the protection, we can have more works with 
more restricted access, or fewer works with broader access.1 1 4  
110. This i s  true a t  least with respect to  future works. As  noted earlier, this justification 
cannot reasonably be applied to works that have already been created. 
111.  See 1 T.B. MACAULAY, MACAULAY'S SPEECHES AND POEMS 285 (A.C. 
Armstrong & Son 1874) ("It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least 
exceptional way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the 
sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is 
necessary for the purpose of securing the good."). 
112. This is the deadweight or static efficiency loss. See, e.g., Economists' Brief, supra 
note 56, at 10-12; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659 (1988); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, When Good Value Chains Go Bad: 
The Economics of Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 963-
64 (2001); Netanel, supra note 107. 
1 13. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 135 (1988) 
("[T]he dilemma is that without a legal monopoly not enough information will be produced 
but with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be used."); Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996). 
114. Some commentators have argued t�at this loss can be avoided if the author can en­
gage in price discrimination. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of 
Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 596-
600 (1998); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
217; see also Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 
(1970); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1203, 1234-40 (1998); Fisher, supra note 112. Thus, for some (that is, so-called "maximalists" 
or "neoclassicists"), an optimal term might be perpetual, assuming that the Constitution did 
not foreclose this option. See Netanel, supra note 107, at 367-68 ("Neoclassicism, therefore, 
has no reason to extinguish the owner's copyright after a term of years."). It isn't clear to me, 
however, that the conditions that would permit perfect (or even close to perfect) price dis­
crimination exist in real copyright markets. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, 
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 53 (1999); Ben 
Depoorter & Francisco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explana­
tion, 21 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 453 (2002); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright 
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1321-22 (2001); 
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 
(2001). Moreover even if they did, other more fundamental objections (including the one in 
the following paragraph) exist to this price discrimination model. See, e.g. , Yochai Benkler, 
An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 V AND. L. REV. 2063 
(2000); Boyle, supra note 53; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 V AND. L. 
REV. 1799 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 
"Rights Management, " 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property 
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Copyright law also presents another trade-off, this one not be­
tween authors and consumers, but between authors and other authors. 
It is a commonplace that new works draw from and build upon old 
ones.1 15 No work is purely and completely new. All works draw upon 
prior works, to at least some extent. Thus, by increasing protection for 
initial works, we may increase the incentives for producing such 
works, but we also increase the cost of producing works that draw 
upon these initial works. 1 16 If protection is too great, we may in fact 
decrease the number of total works (that is, the sum of both original 
and follow-on works). If our aim is to provide adequate incentives for 
both initial and follow-on works, the strength of copyright protection 
needs to reflect this balance.1 17 
The length of the copyright term is one way (among many ways) in 
which this balance is struck.1 18  Too short a term, and the incentives 
may not be sufficient to spur initial creation, since authors may not 
have enough time to obtain sufficient compensation for their efforts. 
Too long a term, and the work may not be widely disseminated or 
built upon over time.1 19 The optimal or ideal copyright term is proba­
bly impossible to determine in any meaningful way.120 Indeed, the aca-
as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1369 {1998); 
Loren, supra note 106; Netanel, supra note 107, at 368. 
1 15. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphosis of "Authorship, " 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 457-63; Litman, supra note 30, at 966-
67 ("But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombi­
nation than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea."). 
116. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 12-13; Gilbert & Katz, supra note 1 12, at 
964-65; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1557 (1993); Landes & Pos­
ner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 333. 
117. See Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107; Mark Lemley, The Eco­
nomics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 989 {1997); Netanel, 
supra note 107, at 295 ("An overly expanded copyright also constitutes a material disincen­
tive to the production and dissemination of creative, transformative uses of preexisting ex­
pression."). 
118. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The lim­
ited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration 
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately 
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts."). 
1 19. See Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 359 (discussing this balance). Bur see Landes & 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (proposing a regime in which copy­
rights could be repeatedly renewed). 
120. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), at 1 33, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5749 ("The debate over how long a copyright should last is as old as the oldest copyright 
statute and will doubtless continue as long as there is a copyright law."); Netanel, supra note 
107, at 369 ("(l]t is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of precision the 
term of copyright that would lead to optimum support for creative autonomy, while still al­
lowing for sufficient user access."). 
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demic literature on this point has provided no firm guidance.121 Differ­
ent types of works may require different lengths of protection (for ex­
ample, protecting software for ten years would probably be sufficient, 
at least under today's market conditions, given how quickly software 
becomes obsolete).122 Even within a given category of work, much 
might depend on how the market is structured at that particular time, 
what other incentives exist, etc. Thus, a high degree of uncertainty will 
inevitably attend discussions about the proper term. The precise num­
ber chosen will always be, to some extent, arbitrary.123 Thus Congress 
should properly be given some degree of discretion in setting the 
term.124 
Even conceding a good degree of Congressional discretion, how­
ever, there are good reasons to believe that the current period is too 
long, i.e. that it substantially hinders access without a corresponding 
benefit in incentives.125 Under an incentive justification, the reason for 
the copyright extension is that it will increase the incentives for the 
121. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4; Saul Cohen, 
Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old 
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 825 (2001) (discussing duration); Landes & 
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107; Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copy­
right, supra note 61; Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 359-60; Edward C. Walterscheid, The 
Remarkable - And Irrational - Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 233 (2001); see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
172 (1996) (suggesting a twenty-year term); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: 
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 251 (2001) (proposing a series of 
renewable 5-year terms). Similar literature exists regarding the optimal patent term (with 
similarly little in the way of firm guidance). See, e.g. , WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, 
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
76-86 (1969); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 106; Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the 
Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990). 
122. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 137 n.192; 
RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, 
MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 487 (7th ed. 1998) (suggesting possibility of varying terms 
depending on nature of the work). 
123. The discussion here focuses on how long the copyright term should be as a matter 
of theory. For a historical explanation for the copyright term, see Walterscheid, supra note 
90, at 381-86. 
124. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu­
dios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Note, 
however, that such discretion also provides a strong incentive for interested parties to peti­
tion for extensions of the time period. See infra Section II.D. 
125. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by Wendy Gordon) (suggesting 
that "an instrumentalist would oppose the extension [because] [i]t provides twenty more 
years of making works expensive and difficult to access, without giving a compensating gain 
in incentives"); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An 
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2001) (calling the current long duration of 
copyright "a major economic puzzle" and rejecting proffered explanations as implausible); 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1244 
(1998) ("It is scarcely credible that authors' or publishers' decisions, say, in 1998 will be af­
fected by rights that their successors will have in 2073 and thereafter."). 
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creation of new works. As a matter of simple economics, however, ad­
ditional increases in the copyright term result in ever-decreasing 
amounts of additional incentive. For the vast majority of works, there 
will be little demand more than fifty years after the death of the 
author.126 Even for those few works that still retain some market value, 
the present value of any future income streams will be miniscule. This 
is because of the simple economic phenomenon of the time value of 
money.127 
To see this, take the following example.128 Assume, for simplicity's 
sake, that an author creates a work in 2000 at age forty and dies in the 
year 2030 at age seventy. The term of protection under the 1976 Act 
would have been until the year 2080. Under the term extension, how­
ever, the term will now expire in 2100. What was the incentive value of 
that additional twenty years? Let's assume a discount rate of ten per­
cent. Let's further assume that the author is one of the very fortunate 
few whose work is still generating some revenue for his estate from 
2081 through 2100. If the work generated one dollar each year for the 
period from 2081 through 2100, the net present value of that cash flow 
would be about 0.42 cents, or just under half a penny.129 If the work is 
126. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5 ("According to the 1961 Report of the Register of 
Copyrights, fewer than fifteen percent of all copyrights were renewed under the 1909 Act."). 
127. See Affidavit of Hal R. Varian <j[ 3, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 {D.D.C. 1999) 
{No. 99-0065) [hereinafter Varian Affida'(it] {"In my opinion, extending current copyright 
terms by 20 years for new works has a tiny effect on the present value of cash flows from 
creative works and will therefore have an insignificant effect on the incentives to produce 
such works."), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2002); Economists' Brief, supra note 56; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT 
DURATION, supra note 4, at 60; RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 46-
47 (5th ed. 1998) ("[A]s a result of discounting to present value, the knowledge that you may 
be entitled to a royalty on your book 50 to 100 years after you publish it is unlikely to affect 
your behavior today.") (internal citation omitted); Breyer, supra note 50, at 324 .("More 
probably authors, like others, discount the value of future income, and, when discounted, the 
present value of a future copyright advantage is small."); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to 
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1679 (1999) ("At some point, attempts to defend increased dura­
tion on incentive grounds become implausible because of the decreasing time value of 
money."); Merges, supra note 76, at 2236-37 ("From an incentive point of view, the Act is 
virtually worthless; viewed from a present-value perspective, the additional incentive to cre­
ate a copyrightable work is negligible for an extension of copyright from life-plus-fifty years 
to life-plus-seventy years."). Indeed, this very basic point was recognized as early as 150 
years ago by Macaulay: "[A]n advantage that is to be enjoyed more than half a century after 
we are dead, by somebody, we know not by whom, perhaps by somebody unborn, by some­
body utterly unconnected with us, is really no motive at all to action." See 1 MACAULAY, 
supra note 111, at 286, quoted in Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 
45 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1 945). 
128. This example is adapted from Economists' Brief, supra note 56, and Varian Affida­
vit, supra note 127. For similar calculations, see Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 23; 
Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61. 
129. The present value of a future payment of $1 is 1/{l+r)"n, where r is the discount 
rate and n is the number of years in the future when the payment is made. See Varian Affi­
davit, supra note 127. The 0.42-cent figure is simply the sum of the present values for $1 
payments from years 2081 through 2100. 
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successful, generating say $100,000 per year even that far out into the 
future, the present value of that cash flow would be approximately 
$420. 
Moreover, we have assumed, unrealistically, that the return is ab­
solutely certain. If we instead discount that amount further by the un­
certainty associated with receiving any revenue eighty years later, the 
amount would be even less. If, for example, only one percent130 of 
published novels have any kind of staying power fifty years later, the 
expected value would be $4.20. Thus, in order to accept the incentive 
justification, one would need to believe that the prospect of an addi­
tional $4.20 to the author in 2000 would be sufficient to result in an 
appreciable increase in creative effort. 131 
Yet one needn't accept this argument, or even believe that the cur­
rent period is too long, to accept the argument that time should at 
least have some impact on the level of protection. That is because, if 
we accept the incentive argument for copyright protection, the value 
of the additional incentive to the author decreases the further out we 
go on the copyright term. This is again the result of the time value of 
money. Revenue from the first ten years of protection is more valu­
able than revenue from the next (assuming the amounts of revenue 
are the same), because the revenue from the next ten years is subject 
to a greater period of discounting.132 And so on. Thus, the present 
value, and therefore incentive impact, of revenue in the last twenty 
years of a copyright's term is far less than the first. In the example 
above, assuming the same revenue received in the first twenty years, 
the net present value of that cash flow, even prior to discounting to ac­
count for the probability of continued success, would be more than 
$850,000 compared to $420 from the last twenty years. The incentive 
130. This figure is likely generous. Rates of copyright renewal under the pre-1976 re­
gime are an indicator of the economic value of copyrighted works over time. These renewal 
rates suggest that the vast majority of works did not have sufficient value to warrant even the 
minimal cost of renewal, even twenty-eight years after publication. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 5 ("According to the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights, fewer than fifteen per­
cent of all copyrights were renewed under the 1909 Act."); Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of 
Copyright, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 617 (Copyright Society of the U.S.A. ed., 
1963); see also Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 22-28 
(empirical study of copyright renewal rates indicating that fewer than eleven percent of 
copyrights registered from 1883 to 1964 were renewed, and concluding that "copyrights are 
subject to significant depreciation and have an expected or average life of only about 15 
years"); id. at 28 (estimating that "fewer than 1 in 750 works registered in 1934 will have 
commercial value in 2030"). 
131. This analysis is, admittedly, simplified. To get a truly accurate picture of the incen­
tives involved, one would need to have more concrete data on the range of different possible 
income streams for various types of works, and the likelihood of each income stream in fact 
occurring, etc. However, the analysis does at least give a rough impression of how time im­
pacts the value of income streams that far in the future. 
132. See Varian Affidavit, supra note 127; F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal 
Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 424 (1972) (noting exact 
same phenomenon as relevant in setting optimal patent term). 
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impact of the last twenty years is thus 0.049% of the incentive impact 
of the first twenty years. And again, even this understates the differen­
tial, since it does not adjust for the very likely possibility that revenue 
streams would significantly be reduced (perhaps to nothing) as the 
work becomes older.133 Accordingly, under the incentive view, the fur­
ther out we go in the term, the less we should be concerned about the 
incentive effects134 of finding no or less protection.135 
Conversely, there may be quite strong reasons to be concerned 
about ensuring widespread access over time. The more time that 
elapses from creation, the more difficult it will be for a potential pur­
chaser or licensor to determine who owns the copyright.136 The prob­
lems associated with finding the holders of copyrights have been well­
documented.137' In some cases, a work may no longer be published.138 
In other cases, difficulties may result because the original author is de­
ceased, and the heirs or devisees need to be identified and contacted. 
Alternatively, the more time has passed, the more likely it is that the 
copyright has been transferred to other parties, perhaps several times, 
133. To see how quickly the incentive effect falls off, consider the present value of 
$100,000 annual cashflows for the following periods: 2001-2020: $851 ,356; 2021-2040: 
$126,549; 2041-2060: $18,811 ;  2061-2080: $2,796; 2081-2100: $416. As a percentage of the to­
tal return over the entire 100-year period, the figures are: 2001-2020: 85.14%; 2021-2040: 
12.66%; 2041-2060: l.88%; 2061-2080: 0.28%; 2081-2100: 0.042%. 
134. Justin Hughes identifies, and primarily bases his similar proposal upon, another 
way in which concerns about incentives are less important near the end of the copyright 
term. Focusing specifically on more minor uses which could cause harm if they became more 
widespread (such as personal copying), Hughes notes that the aggregate market harm from 
such uses is necessarily less if they arise late in the copyright term because there is a shorter 
period of remaining time during which the harm will be felt. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra 
note IO. 
135. Note that this holds true even under theories of copyright law that argue that the 
incentive impact results, not necessarily from the return from any given work, but from the 
potential of ever creating a work that generates an exceptional amount of revenue. See, e.g. , 
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of 
Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 350-51 {1995). Even under this view, the future revenues 
from a "hit" must be discounted over the lengthy copyright term. Similarly, the analysis ap­
plies as well to arguments sometimes made that extension of the copyright term is intended 
to benefit an author's descendants, since the amount of this benefit is subject to discounting 
as well. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 172 ("The 1 976 Act term already allowed authors to 
provide for children and grandchildren; will the addition of great-grandchildren to the pro­
spective beneficiaries of the author's work likely inspire the creation of another song or se­
quel?"). 
136. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (2d ed. 1997) 
(discussing tracing costs); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 361. 
137. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 57-58; see 
also, e.g. , Frances M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of 
Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919 (2000) (documenting dispute over copyright 
ownership of the Little House on the Prairie series). 
138. See Breyer, supra note 50, at 325 ("[A]s time passes persons wishing to reproduce 
old articles, books, designs, or other writings find it progressively harder to find the copy­
right owner to secure permission - particularly when copying is necessary because, for ex­
ample, a book is out of print."). 
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and the more complicated it is to identify and contact the current 
holders. There may also be a good deal of uncertainty over who ex­
actly owns the rights, due to the rather complex provisions of the 
Copyright Act involving renewals,139 termination of transfer,140 and in­
heritance.141 Finally, complexities about formalities,142 renewal143 and 
copyright term extension may call into doubt whether the work is even 
still copyrighted.144 All of these problems become more acute as the 
time from creation increases and records and memories grow thin, 
thus making access to the work more problematic as time passes.145 In­
deed, these costs have been viewed by some as the primary policy rea­
son for the limited term.146 
In addition, as time passes, the interest in having works that build 
upon the original increases. As mentioned above, one of the trade-offs 
in copyright law involves balancing incentives between initial works 
and follow-on works. 147 The elements of this trade-off vary across time. 
In the initial years of a copyright's term, we are more concerned with 
compensating the original author for his or her creative labor, since 
these years have the greatest incentive effect. Over time, however, 
that incentive wanes, as discussed above. Conversely, as developed in 
more detail in the following section, the longer a work has been avail­
able to the public the more it becomes a likely candidate for others to 
build upon. It becomes part of the stock of works that future authors 
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 {2000). 
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
141. See id. 
142. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 3.0-3.19. 
143. See id. § 4.9. 
144. The Copyright Act does include certain record-keeping provisions designed to 
make it easier to determine whether a work is copyrighted and who owns it. See, e.g. , 17 
U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4), 205, 302(d), 408, 705 (2000). And as more records are made available 
over the Internet, some of the above costs may be reduced. See Bell, supra note 114 (making 
broader point that the Internet will reduce licensing costs online); Landes & Posner, Indefi­
nitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 6 (noting that such costs could be reduced pro­
spectively). However, the difficulties associated with determining copyright status and own­
ership still remain formidable. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium, supra note 4, at 22 n.27. 
145. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 13; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT 
DURATION, supra note 4, at 59 ("The costs that copyright imposes are likely to increase as 
the period of protection lengthens."); id. at 59 n.91 (describing the various costs); Cohen, 
supra note 121, at 1185; Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 112 n.3 (noting same phe­
nomenon in the patent context). Although this is a general rule, there may, of course, be ex­
ceptions. For example, there is little doubt about who owns the rights to Mickey Mouse. 
Thus, in some cases time may not accurately reflect this interest. I will address this in more 
detail below in Section IV.B, as part of my general response to the objection that time is 
merely a proxy for other factors that should be considered expressly. 
146. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 1185; Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 107; see also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1907) 
(Holmes, J., concurring). 
147. See Lemley, supra note 117. 
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have encountered and upon which they might want to build.148 Even if 
it is possible to license the right to create a derivative work from the 
copyright holder, any license fee (not to mention the tracing and nego­
tiation costs already discussed) serves to increase the cost (and reduce 
the incentives) for such follow-on works. Accordingly, to the extent 
that we are interested in balancing incentives for both initial and sec­
ondary works, fair use should vary over time.149 
Thus, even if we cannot say with any certainty what the optimal 
length of the copyright term should be, we can say with confidence 
that time should at the very least be relevant under the incentive justi­
fication, and that the scope of copyright protection should properly be 
sensitive to the impact of time on incentives and access. The longer a 
work has been out, the weaker the incentive claim and the greater the 
access claim. Thus, one would expect the scope of copyright protection 
to decrease over time, under the incentive view.150 
B .  Encouraging Re-Use and Critique 
Sometimes one hears a variation of the incentive argument that 
goes like this: copyrights (and other intellectual property rights) are 
needed not only to provide incentives for the initial creation of crea­
tive works, but also for their orderly exploitation. That is, we give ex­
clusive rights to copyright owners not only so that they have an incen­
tive to write a book as an initial matter, but so they can also have 
control over sequels, movies based on the book, and other derivative 
works. Although this "prospect theory" has been most powerful in the 
148. Indeed, for some particularly famous works, there may effectively be no reasonable 
substitutes. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 707-08 (statement of Wendy Gordon); 
Gordon, supra note 116; cf Breyer, supra note 50, at 324 n.170 (suggesting that owners of 
copyrights in works that achieve "classic" status may be subject to less price competition 
since there will be fewer substitutes). 
149. See Lemley, supra note 1 17, at 999 ("The limited duration of patents and copyrights 
promotes improvements in writings and inventions, by allowing subsequent authors and in­
ventors to build upon what came before them."). 
150. A number of commentators, in discussing term extension, have argued that to accu­
rately balance the costs and benefits of term extension, we need to discount both the costs 
and the benefits. See Breyer, supra note 50, at 327 n.181; see also Hatch, supra note 7, at 736; 
Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 362. That is, just as we discount the 
future revenue streams from additional protection, we should also discount the loss to con­
sumers and others from extension. See Hatch, supra note 7, at 736-37; accord Economists' 
Brief, supra note 56, at 12-15. However, this observation does not undercut the proposal in 
this Article, since what is relevant is not an absolute comparison of costs and benefits as we 
progress further out in the copyright term. Instead, what is relevant is the relative signifi­
cance of costs and benefits over time. That is, costs (such as tracing and other transactions 
costs) can be expected to increase as we progress further out in the copyright term, whereas 
revenues can generally be expected to stay constant or, more likely, decrease as the work 
fades in importance. (This latter assumption, while probably true in most cases, may not be 
true in all, and I discuss these cases in Section IV.B, infra). Thus, even if we discount both 
costs and benefits, the relative weight of these two factors can be expected to change over 
the copyright term, thus lending support to the proposal that time should make a difference. 
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field of patents,151 it has had some impact on copyright as well, par­
ticularly in the area of derivative works. The basic idea is that only one 
party should have control over Mickey Mouse.152 Imagine if anyone in 
the world could make their own Mickey Mouse movie. We would soon 
have different versions of Mickey (for example, evil Mickey, Mickey 
in space, an Asian Mickey), and the value created by the original 
author would be dissipated.153 Thus, copyright law needs to extend 
protection to works to provide for orderly development and careful 
preservation of value.154 
As an initial matter, there are some theoretical limitations to this 
justification for copyright law. Unlike patent law, copyright law is, in 
Paul Goldstein's terms, centrifugal rather than centripetal.155 Patent 
law deals with inventions and processes, and the overarching ideal is 
efficiency. That is, we want technology and innovation to converge on 
the most efficient solution or set of solutions. Under such conditions, 
orderly development of technology may make sense. By contrast, 
copyright seeks a diversity of expression. It is designed to permit 
variations, new expressions built upon existing ideas.156 We are not ter­
ribly disturbed by the idea that anyone can make a movie re-telling, in 
any form, the story of Romeo and Juliet157 or record a new interpreta­
tion of a Beethoven Symphony - indeed, this is generally seen as a 
good thing. While some ability to control derivative works may be de­
sirable, too much control may not be. The prospect theory thus has 
more limited application in the copyright arena. 
Even within the prospect justification, however, there is ample 
support for the idea that the scope of copyright should vary with time. 
It may well be that an author should be given some period of time 
during which to develop and control variations or derivative works 
151. See, e.g. , Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977). 
152. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1069; Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property 
and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 923, 984-86 (1999) [hereinafter 
Hughes, Recoding]. 
153. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 12-13 
(analogizing this to over-grazing of common pasture). 
154. See H ughes, Recoding, supra note 152; Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 107; Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 15-16 (ana­
lyzing this in terms of "congestion externalities"); Jane Ginsburg, Essay, Copyright and In­
termediate Users' Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67 (1999). 
155. See Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITI. 
L. REV. 1119, 1 123 (1986) ("The aim of copyright is to direct investment toward abundant 
rather than efficient expression."). 
156. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 14; Goldstein, supra note 155; Gordon, su­
pra note 1 16, at 1557; Robert Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure 
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993). 
157. Compare WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET, with 
WEST SIDE STORY (United Artists 1961), and ROMEO + JULIET (20th Century Fox 1996). 
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based upon the original work. This could be justified on both a straight 
incentive rationale and a prospect rationale. Over time, however, that 
justification weakens, since the author has already had ample oppor­
tunity to engage in such development. Thus, it may be fair to give an 
author at least ten, perhaps twenty or even thirty years to write one or 
several sequels. But if she hasn't written a sequel after fifty years, per­
haps her interest in controlling the orderly development of the work is 
more attenuated and others should be permitted to build more aggres­
sively on the work.158 Alternatively, if she has written twenty sequels in 
the intervening years, then perhaps she has adequately fulfilled that 
interest and the work should now be subject to interpretation from 
other perspectives. Either way, her interest, like the incentive interest, 
grows weaker as time passes.159 
At the same time, society's interest in seeing different perspectives 
and re-interpretations of the original work increases over time. In­
deed, a number of commentators have argued that copyright must do 
more to actively support an interest in the reinterpretation of copy­
righted works.160 In recent years, a number of scholars have critiqued 
the recent expansion of intellectual property law, focusing in particu­
lar on the extent to which the expansion hinders the ability of others 
to re-cast, transform, and derive new meanings from existing copy­
righted works. These arguments have been particularly forceful in the 
areas of trademark law161 and the right of publicity.162 The basic claim 
is that people must have some degree of freedom to play with intellec­
tual goods, to re-cast them, to imbue them with meanings independent 
of the ones that the original author intended, in order to make sense 
of them. These transformative activities are an essential part of what it 
158. See LESSIG, supra note 121, at 258-59 (suggesting a "use it or lose it" system where, 
if a work is not made commercially available, others would be permitted to use it, perhaps 
under a compulsory license); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGIT AL COPYRIGHT 12-14 (2001 ). 
159. And certainly such an interest in giving an author time to fully realize his or her 
artistic vision is not applicable after the author is dead. Indeed, it is unclear how this interest 
would be served by giving such a right to the author's heirs or transferees. See BARD & 
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 120-21 n.159. 
160. See, e.g., ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); JANE GAINES, 
CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991); KAPLAN, supra 
note 106, at 74-75; Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellec­
tual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1853 (1991); Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Fisher, supra note 112; Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 
11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467 (1994); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of 
the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139; Liu, supra note 1 14, at 1327-29; Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. 
L. REV. 127 (1993). 
161. See, e.g. , Dreyfuss, supra note 160. 
162. See, e.g. , Madow, supra note 160. 
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means to consume an intellectual good.163 Although these scholars 
recognize the need to provide incentives for the creation of such 
works, they are concerned that the scope of protection should not be 
so expansive as to limit essential critique and transformation.164 
These interests provide further support for consideration of time in 
fair use analysis. Again, one need not buy the argument in its entirety 
or even agree with any particular implementation; one need only rec­
ognize that time has an impact on the relative importance of this 
value. As discussed above, over time the original author's interest in 
controlling orderly exploitation of the work wanes. At the same time, 
as time passes the copyrighted work is more likely to be part of the 
common stock of works and ideas that others have encountered and 
wish to build upon. The longer a work has been published, the more 
desirable it becomes as material for discussion or re-casting.165 The 
longer a work has been out, the more likely it is that other authors will 
have encountered it and wish to build upon it or incorporate it into 
their own subsequent works.166 
Copyright law already recognizes this to some extent (in theory, if 
not in practice),167 through the limited copyright term. As their copy­
right terms expire, works pass from protected status into the public 
domain where they can be freely built upon, transformed, re-cast, and 
re-imagined by others. According to many commentators, the public 
163. See Lange, supra note 160. 
164. See also Netanel, supra note 107, at 369 (deriving limit from copyright's role in cre­
ating conditions for a democratic civil society). 
165. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 60 ("Indeed, 
contrary to what is often asserted or assumed, the fact that a particular work enjoys lasting 
popularity is not a reason to extend the term of copyright but rather a reason to limit it. Its 
continued value heightens the interest in widespread dissemination and underlines the con­
tribution to national culture and learning which follows from its entrance into the public 
domain where it can function as a building block of intellectual and imaginative activity."); 
Gordon, supra note 116; Note, Originality, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1 993 (2002) ("When 
certain texts have shaped our means of talking and thinking about important ideas, riffing on 
those texts in new literary works is a powerful way to refashion our language, worldview, 
and aesthetic. Such canonical texts are likely to be old, and thus to be in the public domain. 
But many famous texts are still under copyright."). 
166. See Note, supra note 10, at 1209 (proposing that courts deciding cases involving an 
author's re-telling of another's literary work expressly consider whether the original work 
"occupies a place of such culturally iconic status that not to permit a re-writing of it would 
suppress important and necessary discussion of that work."). 
167. The extension of the copyright term is but one of the ways in which passage of 
copyrighted works into the public domain has been hindered. Prior to 1976, copyright law 
required compliance with a number of formalities, such as notice, and if such formalities 
were not observed, a work would pass into the public domain. Thus, many works in fact 
passed into the public domain as a result of failure to comply with formalities. In 1976, how­
ever, Congress eliminated such formalities as a prerequisite for copyright protection. See 1 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3.0. As a result, since that date, this avenue for passage into the 
public domain has been closed. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 
supra note 61 (suggesting a renewal requirement as a means of casting additional works into 
the public domain). 
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domain's primary purpose is not to reduce the costs consumers pay for 
copyrighted works or to serve as a repository for works that are not 
worth protecting.168 Instead, its purpose is to serve as a rich repository 
of material for subsequent authors to draw upon for their own works, 
without concerns about infringement or securing licenses.169 Thus any­
one can re-tell Shakespeare's classic story of two "star-cross'd lov­
ers"170 in any form, without first seeking a license to do so. Similarly, 
companies like Disney can mine the public domain for stories (as they 
have repeatedly done, for example, with the Hunchback of Notre 
Dame, Pocahontas, Hercules, Cinderella, The Little Mermaid), to re­
tell and re-imagine into their own copyrighted works. 
A number of scholars have focused a good deal of recent attention 
on developing a richer concept of the public domain to serve as a 
counterweight to the recent expansionist tendency of intellectual 
property law.171 These scholars have been concerned about the appar­
ent lack of any structural mechanisms to counterbalance such expan­
sions. Accordingly, they have begun to work towards concretely ar­
ticulating the benefits that derive from a robust public domain and the 
harms associated with granting ever-stronger private rights over in-
168. See Litman, supra note 30, at 967-68. 
169. See id. at 968 ("The public domain should be understood not as the realm of mate­
rial that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to 
work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use."). 
170. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, Prologue. 
171. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (hereinafter Boyle, Enclosure]; Charlotte 
Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool 
Resource, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, 
Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 
2002); Pamela Samuelson, Digital Information, Digital Networks, and the Public Domain, 52 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (all papers available at http:l/www.law.duke.edu/ 
pd/papers.html); see also BOYLE, supra note 125, at 363; LESSIG, supra note 121; Keith Aoki, 
Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Do­
main, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 191 (1994); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Com­
mon Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, 
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1 415 (1992); Paul Heald, Reviving the 
Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of 
Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That - A Re­
luctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitllfionally-Grounded Discourse of Public 
Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996); Netanel, supra note 107, 
at 368; Patterson, Understanding, supra note 90, at 368 ("A major purpose of copyright . . .  is 
to protect the public domain, an idea that may be counter-intuitive, but is also irrefutable."); 
Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 137 
(1993). See generally Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University Law School (Nov. 
9-11 ,  2001), available at http:/fwww.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (visited Sept. 20, 2002). 
This rich body of recent literature draws from earlier works analyzing the value of the public 
domain. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A 
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991); Gordon, supra note 116, at 1562; Lange, supra note 30, at 
147; Litman, supra note 30; see also KAPLAN, supra note 106; Ralph Brown Jr., Unification: 
A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070 (1977). 
November 2002] Copyright and Time 441 
formation.172 According to these scholars, the eventual passage of 
works into the public domain is an essential feature of our existing 
copyright structure.173 
What has been less widely acknowledged has been the way in 
which works begin this passage from private to public even during the 
term of protection. That is, certain copyrighted works can take on 
more and more public character over time as they become more en­
trenched in popular consciousness and culture.174 Consider, for exam­
ple, the iconic status of Mickey Mouse. In the early days, the cultural 
meaning attached to Mickey was probably not much more than the 
meaning attached to other cartoon characters of the time. Over time, 
however, Mickey has come to signify much more in our society and 
become a target for recasting and a focal point for alternate mean­
ings.175 In many ways, the public's claim on Mickey has increased over 
time, even during its period of copyright protection.176 Many authors 
have thoughtfully analyzed the extent to which certain images, sym­
bols, and characters may be necessary for us to engage in dialogue 
about popular culture and our surroundings.177 As time passes, works 
begin the passage from pure products of creative expression to objects 
that are part of our collective cultural history. 
Or, to take a narrower doctrinal example, consider how such things 
as stock characters or scenes a faire,178 which are generally not pro­
tected by copyright law, come to attain that status. A work, character, 
or scene might start out as pure expression but, over the passage of 
time, start to resemble more closely a pure idea, a stock character, or a 
stock scene as the public is exposed to it and as others build and 
172. But see Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 11-16 
(suggesting that there may be inefficiencies associated with public domain status). 
173. See Netanel, supra note 107, at 368-69 (proposing a democratic approach to copy­
right scope that "would hold that works should at some point become a part of our common 
cultural heritage because they have considerable social value, not simply because of market 
failure"). 
174. See Madow, supra note 160. 
175. See, e.g. , Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de­
nied, 439 U.S. 1 132 (1979) (rejecting defense of fair use for defendants who published a 
bawdy adult comic book featuring Mickey Mouse). 
176. An analog to this can be found in the trademark doctrine of genericism, where a 
trademarked term can lose its trademark status if the public adopts the word for use as a 
general term for the product (for example, escalator, thermos, aspirin). See Coombe, supra 
note 160; Dreyfuss, supra note 160. 
177. See Gordon, supra note 116. See generally supra note 160; Litman, supra note 30, at 
1013-17 (describing the way in which certain works "seep" into common usage). But see 2 
Goldstein, supra note 5, § 10.2.l(b) (discussing satire). 
178. Scenes a faire are elements of a creative work that are necessary to express an un­
derlying unprotectible idea, scene, or plot. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.3.2.2. 
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elaborate upon it.179 The first person to write a scene involving a villain 
tying a heroine to the train tracks180 or a story involving a hard-boiled 
private detective might have created something that involved almost 
pure expression. However, as others repeat and embellish these ideas, 
they become stock scenes and characters, moving from expression to­
wards idea, 181 from the realm of private protection toward the public 
domain. 
This view of the public claim on cultural works has been critiqued 
by a number of commentators. For example, Jane Ginsburg has 
sharply criticized the attempt by some commentators to shift the focus 
of copyright away from authors and towards the audience.182 In par­
ticular, she has objected to the threads of this literature that draw 
heavily from post-modern and critical cultural theories, arguing that 
they go too far in eliminating the author's privileged role in copyright 
law. Similarly, Justin Hughes has analyzed audience interests and con­
cluded that audiences also have an interest in the stability of the 
meaning of cultural artifacts.183 That is, there may be audience mem­
bers who would prefer more stable cultural artifacts, and making it too 
easy for others to transform or adapt these works may undercut the 
interests of these audience members. The argument that the public has 
some claim on a work is thus not uncontroversial. 
One need not, however, go so far as to eliminate or greatly reduce 
consideration of authorial interests to recognize that these interests 
may be affected by the passage of time. Similarly, recognition that 
time may increase the public's claim on a work does not result in com­
plete failure to consider the author's initial interests. Instead, one only 
needs to recognize that both of these interests exist, and that the bal­
ance between them is affected by the passage of time. In the initial 
years, authorial interests are at their greatest. But over time, these in­
terests wane and the public claim on the work increases. We may dif­
fer over precisely when and where the balance shifts. But the proposal 
179. See Litman, supra note 30, at 1016-17 ("Some aspects of works of authorship are 
easily absorbed, and once we have absorbed them, we are likely to make them our own and 
lose sight of their origins. Ideas, information, short phrases, simple plots, themes, stock 
scenes, and utilitarian solutions to concrete problems all share this characteristic."). 
180. Thanks to my colleague Alfred Yen for suggesting this example. 
181. This Article has focused on fair use as the doctrinal avenue for considering time as 
a factor in setting the scope of copyright protection. It is possible that time could have an 
impact on other copyright doctrines as well, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the 
scenes a faire doctrine. For the purposes of this Article, however, I have focused on fair use 
because, as demonstrated in the following section, it provides the easiest and clearest doc­
trinal avenue for consideration of time-related interests. 
182. See Jane Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 
U.S.A. 1 (1997). 
183. See Hughes, Recoding, supra note 152; see also Kozinski, supra note 160, at 469; 
Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 14 (analyzing this phenomenon in 
economic terms). 
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in this Article requires, at bottom, simply recognition of this bal­
ance.184 
Given that this movement from purely private to public is a grad­
ual one, it is a bit odd that copyright law does not expressly recognize 
this in setting the scope of protection, but rather purports to provide 
full protection up to the end of the copyright term, and then abruptly 
none at all. Consideration of time in fair use analysis would have the 
desirable result of permitting more extensive transformation, critique, 
and re-use of copyrighted works over time. Although this interest has 
admittedly not played as central a role in setting the copyright bal­
ance, we might expect this interest to be more relevant as the copy­
right term extends to keep many more works from falling into the 
public domain. In any event, consideration of time would have the 
beneficial effect of permitting the scope of such transformation, cri­
tique, and re-use to vary over time. 
C. Rewarding Authors 
The incentive· argument discussed above is by far the most impor­
tant and influential justification for copyright under U.S. law. Thus, 
the arguments above should be sufficient by themselves to give most 
courts reason to adopt time as a factor in fair use. In recent years, 
however, other noneconomic theories of copyright law have begun to 
make inroads. Although they do not approach the incentive argument 
in importance or influence, I will address them here at least briefly and 
show that they too support the proposal. 
The strongest of these alternative theories has been the "author 
reward" argument. Based in part on the writings of John Locke, this 
justification holds that copyright law is a reward for the creative labor 
of authors.1 85 Unlike the incentive argument; the author reward argu­
ment is not based on the idea that authors should be rewarded in or­
der to provide greater benefits for society more generally. Rather, the 
argument is that the authors have a moral claim to their creative 
works, based on natural law. This argument often finds expression not 
184. Thus, the proposal here is not necessarily inconsistent with Justin Hughes's obser­
vation that some consumers may have an interest in the stable meaning of creative works. 
See Hughes, Recoding, supra note 152. Rather, the proposal provides a mechanism for bal­
ancing that interest, over time, with the countervailing interest in disrupting such stable 
meanings. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10. 
185. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intel­
lectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1992-1993); Gordon, supra note 1 16; Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred Yen, Re­
storing the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); R. 
Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copy­
right Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995) (analyzing features of copyright 
term under competing views of Lockean labor theory). 
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only in specific judicial opinions and particular features of copyright 
law, but also in common intuitions about fair treatment of authors and 
creators. That this justification has force can clearly be seen from the 
fact that copyright law fully protects works that would have been cre­
ated even without any financial incentive, like research papers, per­
sonal letters, and diary entries.186 Copyright legislation is often influ­
enced by these moral claims from authors.187 
The author reward justification has come under attack on a num­
ber of grounds. In particular, to the extent that this argument is based 
on the Lockean notion that all are entitled to the fruits of their own 
labor, some have questioned whether Locke's famous sufficiency pro­
viso188 is satisfied, that is, whether there is "enough and as good" for 
others.189 After an author has asserted rights over a work, are there 
"enough and as good" other works or ideas out there for others to 
claim? Others have critiqued the author reward argument for the 
practical reason that it appears to have few limiting principles.190 Re­
ward to authors tells us little about how much protection is enough, 
how much is too much, how much authors deserve.191 One could, for 
example, use the author reward argument to justify perpetual copy­
right ownership in the fruits of an author's labor.192 
A number of scholars have responded to this last critique by find­
ing ways to limit the potential reach of natural law, thereby rendering 
it more useful as a practical justification for copyright law.193 One such 
186. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 185. 
1 87. See, e.g., Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hear­
ings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 233-36 (1995) (statement of Quincy 
Jones); id. at 240 (prepared statement of Bob Dylan, songwriter); id. at 241-42 (prepared 
statement of Don Henley). 
188. See LOCKE, supra note 185, at 291. 
189. Wendy Gordon has argued that in some cases, restrictions on the ability to build 
upon certain very prominent types of works might violate Locke's sufficiency proviso. See 
Gordon, supra note 1 16. That is, there may be a category of works that are so prominent, 
important, and/or unique that they are necessary in order to express oneself intelligibly 
about certain subjects and/or ideas. In such cases, giving an author the right to prevent uses 
of such essential properties may not in fact leave "enough and as good" for others because 
others might in fact be worse off than if the author had never created the work in the first 
place. See id; Symposium, supra note 63, at 682 (comments by Wendy Gordon) (discussing 
how this perspective would lead to a limited copyright term). 
190. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142. 
191. See Reese, supra note 185, at 712 (arguing that "libertarian Lockeanism" does not 
clearly prescribe the scope of intellectual property rights). 
192. Indeed, such arguments were advanced in support of perpetual copyright in Eng­
land. Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 345-46; id. at 359 (recognizing that "if 'reward for gen­
ius' is considered the more important rationale, then there is a pronounced tendency to 
lengthen the term of patents and copyrights to better assure that the 'reward' will actually 
occur"); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 65, 101-04 (1997). 
193. See Gordon, supra note 1 16; Litman, supra note 30; Yen, supra note 185. 
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limit is based on the recognition that individuals are only entitled to 
fruits of their labor that are adequately measurable and practically de-. 
finable.194 This is based on the observation that creative labor is rarely 
the product of a single author, working alone. Rather, authors take 
ideas, thoughts, concepts, and observations from other authors and so­
ciety at large as the raw material of their work.195 The final work is not 
solely the product of one author's labor, but also of the labor of many 
others. As a result, the rights of the author should properly be limited, 
not absolute.196 
These limits lend support to the idea of a limited copyright term.197 
Difficulties in tracing the provenance of works can be expected to in­
crease over time, thus imposing a limit on the ability to clearly define 
the entitlement. To the extent that the author reward view is limited 
by the need to define entitlements with at least some degree of preci­
sion, this reward should wane as time and definitional problems in­
crease. Moreover, this limitation recognizes that all authors generally 
benefit from being able to build upon the ideas of others, and that 
they all share an obligation of some kind to prior authors.198 Thus, the 
eventual passage of an author's work into the public domain can be 
seen as part of the bargain that the author strikes in creating a work 
that inevitably builds upon the creative labor of those who have pre­
ceded her.199 To the extent that an author herself has built upon the 
labor of others before her, she has a moral obligation to similarly per­
mit those coming after her to build upon ner labor. The idea is that 
authors have a moral obligation to help replenish the public domain.200 
194. See Yen, supra note 185. 
195. See Gordon, supra note 1 16, at 1556; Litman, supra note 30, at 1007-08. 
196. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142 ("The 
appeal of the natural rights argument is also lessened by recognition of the contributions of 
others to the author's or artist's work."); Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by 
Wendy Gordon); Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 
36-40 (1989); Litman, supra note 30, at 1011 ;  Reese, supra note 185; Yen, supra note 185. A 
variation of this idea, based on post-modern literary theory, suggests that authorship as a 
concept should have less relevance today, and that the audience also has a strong claim to 
providing meaning for the work. See, e.g. , Lange, supra note 160; see also Jaszi, supra note 
1 15, at 457-63. But see Ginsburg, supra note 182. 
197. Even those who support a more author-centric conception of copyright law were 
troubled by the Sonny Bono Term Extension Act, insofar as the Act appeared to focus more 
on rewarding copyright holders rather than the authors and their families. See Ginsburg, su­
pra note 35, at 171; Patry, supra note 4; Patry, Failure, supra note 60 
1 98. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by Wendy Gordon); Yen, supra 
note 185. 
199. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 683. 
200. See Gordon, supra note 1 16, at 1557-58. Dawn Nunziato has developed this claim 
more formally in analyzing the issue of "intergenerational justice" among authors. See Dawn 
C. Nunziato, Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (2002). Nunziato applies a 
rights-based, Rawlsian analysis to the issue, and argues that authors, behind a Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance, would agree to limitations on the scope of their intellectual property rights, 
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Again, these observations tell us little about how long to set the 
term. They may suggest a limit imposed by time, but do little to indi­
cate what that limit should be. Once again, however, a precise figure is 
not necessary to support the broader argument that time should mat­
ter. Once we accept the view that an author's moral claim to compen­
sation should be limited and that a limit on the term of the copyright is 
an appropriate mechanism for such a limitation, it also follows that the 
longer a piece has been out, the weaker the author's moral claim to 
compensation is. As time passes, difficulties in defining the scope of 
the entitlement increase. Moreover, the longer the piece has been out, 
the greater the chance that it has contributed to the stock of ideas to 
which the original author owes a debt, and upon which other authors 
will want to build. 
In addition, the continuing success of a work many years after its 
original creation may undercut the moral claim to reward in another 
way. If copyright is seen as a reward for creative labor, then we might 
ask to what extent the revenue generated by a work seventy years af­
ter the author's death is directly the result of such labor. Indeed, it 
may well be that the continued success of such a work owes less to the 
original labor of the author, and more to the contributions of society 
or the public more generally in imbuing that work with certain mean­
ings.201 Again, take the case of Mickey Mouse. To what extent is the 
continuing success of that work due to the original creative labor of 
Mr. Walt Disney? Do we really believe that the relative success of 
Mickey Mouse over other cartoon characters of the time is solely or 
even primarily the result of better creative choices made by Mr. 
Disney at the time?202 A strong argument exists that, the further we 
move from the original creative act, the more likely it is that the con­
tinuing success of the work is due to factors unrelated to the original 
creative labor.203 Thus, we can expect the moral claim for reward to 
wane over time. 
A closely-related, though analytically separate, line of argument 
focuses on the need to protect certain personality interests of authors. 
This justification asserts that products of creative thought are pecu­
liarly personal to the author and represent an expression of the indi-
including limitations based on duration. See also Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, su­
pra note 107. 
201. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999) (making a similar point in the trademark context); 
Madow, supra note 160. 
202. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 1 74-75 (1974) (tomato 
soup reductio argument). 
203. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142 ("[T)he 
compensation a person receives for his services often depends on fortuities having no rela­
tion to the level or quality of his efforts."); Hettinger, supra note 196; Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric 
and Realily in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1237-38 (1996). 
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vidual's self, which should be protected from certain types of harm. 
Based in part on the writings of Hegel, and elaborated most effectively 
by Margaret Radin, these arguments justify aspects of copyright pro­
tection based on the personhood interests of the authors.204 Although 
such arguments have generally been much more influential in 
Continental copyright law, they have recently found limited expres­
sion in the United States through the recognition of certain rights of 
integrity and attribution for certain works of fine art.205 These new 
enactments are designed not so much to protect the financial interests 
of authors, as their interests in their reputations as artists. 
Even if one accepts this argument as a basis for some form of copy­
right protection, the impact of this argument wanes with the passage 
of time. Such author interests are by definition peculiarly personal to 
authors. Accordingly, it is difficult to see why such an interest should 
survive the author's own lifetime, much less seventy years after her 
death. Certainly, an author could feel personally or emotionally 
harmed by distortions or mutilation of her work. But after her death, 
it becomes difficult to see why such an interest should be respected.206 
Indeed, U.S. copyright law recognizes very limited rights of integrity 
and attribution only for the life of the author, and only for works that 
are not generally meant for mass consumption.207 Furthermore, these 
interests can become even more attenuated when copyright interests 
have been transferred and are thus owned, not by the original author, 
but by corporations or other entities, as is often the case over time.208 
Hence, even under this view, the interests of the author wane, while 
the corresponding interests of society increase, as time passes.209 
204. See Lawrence Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHl.-KENT L. 
REV. 609, 619-20 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957 (1982). But see Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1219. 
205. See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
206. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 69-70. Note 
that protection of personality interests, even to this extent, assumes individual authorship 
and ownership. Many works may be owned by corporations, either under the work for hire 
doctrine or through subsequent assignment of the copyright. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Mil­
lennium, supra note 4, at 49 & n.87 (statistics suggesting that a large percentage of commer­
cially-valuable copyrighted works are owned by corporations); Hettinger, supra note 196, at 
45 (arguing that this undercuts the personhood argument). 
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). Note that other personal interests in the area of tort 
(for example, defamation) are similarly limited to the lifetime of the individual. See, e.g. , 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (1976). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 
2003) (granting publicity rights to "deceased personalities."). 
208. See Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1246 ("Even so, once the transfer has occurred, the 
personality-based aspect of the author's right is substantially gone."). But see 17 U.S.C. § 
106A (rights retained by author even if copyright transferred). 
209. Accord Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10. 
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D. Political Economy Arguments 
A final set of arguments in support of the proposal can be found in 
pragmatic considerations relating to the manner in which copyright 
law is made in the United States. It is widely accepted that copyright 
legislation responds quite directly to the lobbying efforts of the copy­
right industries.210 It is not hard to see why. A narrow group of inter­
ests - namely the movie, music, publishing, and software industries -
stands to benefit from expansion of intellectual property protection. 
They have the resources and incentives to lobby for such expansion in 
Congress.21 1 By contrast, consumers individually are largely indifferent 
to such expansions. Although they bear much of the cost of expan­
sions, and such costs may be significant in the aggregate,212 each con­
sumer bears only a miniscule share, spread out over time.213 Thus, as 
public choice theorists predict,214 consumers do not band together in 
sufficient numbers to oppose efforts by the copyright industries to ex­
pand protection.215 The few interested groups that do have some focus 
and resources - such as libraries and educational institutions - are 
simply outgunned by the array of countervailing interests. Moreover, 
to the extent that the interests of narrow, more focused groups are 
taken into account, they are usually granted a narrow exemption or 
privilege, leaving the broader expansion intact.216 
210. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 857 (1987); see also Bell, supra note 48, at 786 (arguing that the Copyright Act has 
fallen into "statutory failure"); Denicola, supra note 127, at 1684; Litman, supra note 158, at 
35; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76, at 53-54; Netanel, supra note 9, at 67-70; William F. 
Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996); Sterk, supra note 203, at 1244. 
· 
211. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 11 (ana­
lyzing such expenditures on l�bbying as rent seeking). 
212. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT 
DURATION, supra note 4, 7 1-76, 1 76-77 (estimating costs). 
213. But see Hatch, supra note 7, at 728 (arguing that costs are outweighed by incentive 
and other benefits of extension); O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 174 (suggesting that the costs 
may not be that great, given other doctrines such as fair use that mitigate the impact of the 
extension). 
214. See, e.g. , J. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 
( 1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); MAXWELL L. 
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997); Dan­
iel Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pilblic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 
(1987); see also Frank Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public­
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). 
215. See Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 171; James Boyle, Essay, A Politics of Intellectual 
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1 997) [hereinafter Boyle, Envi­
ronmentalism]. 
216. See Lemley, supra note 90, at 533; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 33 ( 1994); see also, e.g., Digital Millenium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 120l(d)-(h) (2000); 1 7  U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 11 1 ,  1 19, 122 (2000).  
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The impact of this set of circumstances on the expansion of copy­
right protection has been extensively documented. In the substantial 
revision of the Act that occurred in 1976, the copyright industries were 
expressly invited to participate in the crafting of the Act, in part due to 
the complexity of the Act and the difficulty of balancing so many 
competing interests.217 Thus, industry lobbyists had a strong hand in 
setting the scope of protection. Moreover, the consistent expansion of 
the copyright term through the 1960s and 70s, and most recently in the 
Sonny Bono extension act, is a clear example of the political economy 
of copyright protection at work.218 Despite opposition by many intel­
lectual property scholars219 and public interest groups, and despite ex­
tremely strong arguments against extension, Congress recently ex­
tended the term and applied it retroactively, largely in response to 
heavy lobbying pressure from the copyright industries. Given this, it is 
difficult to see how repeated extension of the copyright term can be 
effectively resisted. Existing copyright holders have powerful incen­
tives to keep petitioning Congress for both prospective and retrospec­
tive extensions of the copyright term.220 The public at large will remain 
largely unresponsive.221 
Indeed, one of the more pernicious and underappreciated effects 
of the steady extension of the copyright term over the past thirty years 
has been to condition the public to generally accept a world in which 
cultural objects are owned. The copyright term is currently so long 
that the only works passing into the public domain have been those 
published before the 1920s, works that, while important, have com­
paratively less impact on the public today.222 We have thus grown ac­
customed to a world in which most of the cultural objects we encoun-
217. See Litman, supra note 210; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technologi­
cal Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the 
New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000) (suggesting possible more be­
nign "information transmission" explanation). But see Hatch, supra note 7; cf Hamilton, su­
pra note 4 (positing a more complex relationship). 
218. See Gifford, supra note 51,  at 385-86 (detailing efforts of Disney to secure term ex­
tension). Disney chairman Michael Eisner lobbied personally for the extension. See BARD & 
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 216; Disney Lobbying for Copy­
right Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22. 
219. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51. 
220. Nor are these incentives only recent. See, e.g. , Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 327 
(detailing the practice of seeking extensions to existing patent monopolies in 18th century 
England). 
221. But see Merges, supra note 76, at 2237 (highlighting some cases where opposition 
might arise because of a countervailing interest group, as in the case of proposed database 
protection bills). 
222. Notable exceptions include such public domain works as the character of Santa 
Claus, the works of Shakespeare, and classical music, myths, and stories. 
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ter on a daily basis are owned.223 As a result, we do not by and large 
register losses to the public domain, since we have never truly realized 
its full benefits.224 Indeed, the idea of Disney not owning Mickey 
Mouse seems distinctly odd.225 Contrast this with the state of affairs 
that existed when the initial copyright term was only fourteen years. 
Then, the value of the public domain was much more concrete and 
immediate, since valuable works would soon be in the public domain, 
either through expiration of the term226 or through failure to comply 
with statutory formalities such as notice (which have largely been 
eliminated).227 Or, to take another example, consider the far shorter 
term in patent law, where the benefit from expiring patents is not only 
concrete, but an essential part of the patent bargain. Through the 
gradual extension of the copyright term, the public has been made 
even less sensitive to the value of the public domain, and accordingly, 
will have even less of an incentive to resist term extension efforts.228 
Because of the structural obstacles that limit Congress' ability to 
equitably address the issue of term expansion, judicial action becomes 
more attractive as a mechanism for ensuring that public-regarding 
limits on copyright scope are imposed.229 In recognition of this, many 
commentators have turned to the limits in the Constitution imposed 
by the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.230 However, such 
challenges have significant limitations, as already discussed. The pro-
223. See COOMBE, supra note 1 60 (describing the intellectual property she encounters 
during her daily commute). 
224. See Travis, supra note 36, at 831 ("The public's reversionary interest in most 
twentieth-century works is functionally non-existent."). 
225. See Kozinski, supra note 160, at 467; Lessig, supra note 9, at 1069 ("The ordinary 
person believes, as Disney's Michael Eisner does, that Mickey Mouse should be Disney's for 
time immemorial. The ordinary person doesn't even notice the irony of perpetual protection 
for Disney for Mickey, while Disney turns out The Hunchback of Notre Dame (to the horror 
of the Victor Hugo estate), or Pocahontas, or any number of stories that it can use to make 
new work."). 
226. In his Commentaries shortly after passage of the initial Copyright Act, Justice Story 
wrote that short terms are beneficial because they "admit the people at large, after a short 
interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and inventions without re­
straint." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TliE UNITED STATES 
§ 1 147 (Fred. B. Roghman & Co. 1991) (1833). By contrast, discussions about the value of 
works passing into the public domain has, until recently, been much more muted. 
227. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3.0. 
228. Note there have been recent efforts to change this. See, e.g., Boyle, Enclosure, su­
pra note 171 ;  Boyle, Environmentalism, supra note 215; Conference on the Public Domain, 
Duke Law School (Nov. 9-1 1,  2001), at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/ (last visited Sept. 20, 
2002). 
229. See Merges, supra note 217, at 1 875 ("In this view, courts are a necessary counter­
weight to inevitable rent-seeking on the part of special interests who lobby Congress."); cf 
Macey, supra note 214. 
230. See sources cited supra note 90; see also Lemley, supra note 90, at 531 (describing 
trend); Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76. 
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posal in this Article provides a practical and effective alternative way 
for courts to ameliorate some of the undesirable effects of copyright 
expansion and inject some public-regarding values into copyright 
scope over time.231 Considering time in fair use may be one of the few 
remaining ways for such values to find expression.232 Courts may thus 
be able to adjust the scope of protection to compensate for the in­
crease in the term of protection.233 
It may well be, of course, that courts are no more inclined than 
Congress to inject public-regarding values into the scope of copyright 
protection. Indeed, recent expansion of copyright and general intellec­
tual property protection has not been the exclusive province of 
Congress. Rather, many courts have expanded the scope of intellec­
tual property protection on a number of fronts, through interpreta­
tions of intellectual property statutes and other legal doctrines.234 
Although these expansions cannot be explained by imbalances in 
lobbying power, a number of commentators have suggested various 
alternative reasons for this expansion. One possible explanation is the 
rhetorical appeal of arguments based on the need to protect "property 
rights," without adequate consideration of the potential costs of such 
protection in the intellectual property context.235 Another possibility is 
that, as in the market for legislation, the copyright industries are re­
peat players in copyright litigation,236 and therefore are able to better 
shape the law through selective lawsuits and selective settlements.237 
231. It could be argued that courts should not be engaged in this kind of activity. I ad­
dress this argument expressly below. See infra Section III.B. 
232. See O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 173 (suggesting that "the Bono Act provides an 
even clearer example of how courts can mitigate congressional errors by applying scope­
defining doctrines"). 
233. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (proposing 
an alternative solution to this problem). 
234. See, e.g. , AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. 
Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (extending patent pro­
tection to business methods); MAI Sys. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); 
eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
235. See, e.g. , Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1997) {book review) (critiquing this argument). 
236. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 901 (2001); see also 
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Im­
pulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 279 (1992) (noting that the interests of the broader community 
are not always represented in the adversarial posture of litigation); Lange, supra note 30, at 
176 (suggesting that courts appoint a guardian ad !item for the public domain, in cases in­
volving new intellectual property interests). 
237. Compare Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (suit 
brought against so-called computer "hackers"}, with Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of 
Am., No. 01-CV-2669 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001) (declaratory judgment action brought by com­
puter science professor). 
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Be that as it may, there are reasons to believe that the proposal of­
fered in this Article offers a better avenue for public-regarding values 
to be expressed in the scope of protection. As developed in more de­
tail below, the proposal does not require courts to do any more than 
apply standard fair use analysis. It does not require any major change 
in existing law. Moreover, the equitable balancing test provided by fair 
use will provide courts with an easy way of injecting such values in an 
incremental, case-by-case manner, rather than by adopting a binding 
interpretation of a statutory provision or striking down a statute en­
tirely. Although the effect of such a change might be less dramatic, it 
may well be easier to achieve and will have significant beneficial ef­
fects over the long run. Finally, the courts certainly provide an alterna­
tive avenue for lawmaking that is comparatively more shielded from 
the lobbying pressure of the copyright industries, and thus more able 
to respond receptively to appeals to the public interest.238 
III. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS 
The arguments above establish that there are extremely strong rea­
sons to consider the passage of time in determining the proper scope 
of copyright protection. All of the existing justifications for copyright 
law support the view that copyright protection should vary over time. 
Indeed, after consideration of the above arguments, it seems particu­
larly odd that courts do not consider time. Given the extreme length of 
the current copyright term and the extent to which markets and incen­
tives change over such a long time period, a copyright scope that is 
static and fails to consider the passage of time seems highly artificial. 
What follows, then, is an examination of the doctrinal case for con­
sidering time. That is, given that strong policy reasons exist to consider 
time in copyright law, is there doctrinal support for such a considera­
tion? The answer is a surprisingly strong yes. Indeed, the fair use de­
fense seems tailor-made for such a consideration, and in this section I 
develop the doctrinal argument, based on the text and legislative his­
tory of the Copyright Act as well as case law. I then address a particu­
lar doctrinal argument resulting from the recent term extension. 
A. Text, Legislative History, Case Law 
In building the doctrinal case for this proposal, it is important to 
note at the outset that the fair use defense was created by the courts, 
not by Congress.239 The 1909 Act (and all of the preceding copyright 
acts) nowhere mentioned a defense of fair use. Rather, the early acts 
238. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING I NSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POBLIC POLICY (1994). 
239. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 10:2. 
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defined the rights of copyright owners and presumed that infringe­
ment followed upon violation of these enumerated rights. Courts, in 
applying the 1909 Act, created the fair use defense out of whole cloth, 
viewing it as necessary to support the overall purpose of the Act: the 
creation and broad dissemination of creative works.240 Thus, the courts 
fashioned and developed the fair use defense over time, permitting use 
of a work for various educational, critical, and other purposes, even 
though such uses infringed the literal terms of the statute. In 1976, 
Congress finally approved this line of judicial activism and codified the 
defense in § 107 of the current Copyright Act.241 
Congress's codification of fair use, however, reflected the judicial 
origins of the defense and left the courts with broad discretion to con­
tinue to apply it in a flexible manner. The House Report to the 1976 
Act stated: 
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid­
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum­
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of ex­
act rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope 
of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze 
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technologi­
cal change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is 
and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt 
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.242 
Thus, Congress expressly contemplated that fair use would remain a 
flexible doctrine that judges could freely adapt to meet changing cir­
cumstances.243 
The text of the fair use defense reflects this orientation toward 
flexibility and adaptability, setting forth a number of nonexclusive fac-· 
tors that a court should consider in making the case-by-case determi­
nation of fair use: 
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: fair use. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work . . .  for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching . . .  scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par­
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
240. The earliest articulation of the fair use defense in U.S. law is generally considered 
to be Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). 
241. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 10:2. 
242. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (emphasis added). 
243. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (fair use doctrine " 'permits [and 
requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster' ") (citations omitted); 2 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.4, at 10:11. 
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature . . .  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work . . . .  
Note that the text, as suggested by the legislative history, sets forth 
various factors and purposes, but does not purport to make them ex­
clusive. Instead, courts are expected to continue to apply fair use in a 
flexible manner.244 
A court could, consistent with the text of the Act, properly con­
sider time in at least two places. First, a court could consider the pas­
sage of time under the second fair use factor, the nature of the copy­
righted work.245 Courts have, in considering this factor, generally 
focused on whether the work was creative as opposed to factual, and 
whether it was published or not.246 As a general matter, creative or un­
published works are accorded greater protection than factual or pub­
lished works.247 Nothing in the text of the statute, however, prevents a 
court from also considering the age of the work, since this is certainly 
a part of its "nature." Indeed, courts - including the Supreme Court 
- have considered other aspects of a copyrighted work besides the 
two most common factors in analyzing the nature of the work.248 A 
court could thus, in assessing the "nature" of a copyrighted work, con­
sider the age of the work and thus incorporate this consideration into 
the fair use analysis. 
Second, a court could consider time independently as a separate 
and distinct factor. It is clear from both the text of the statute and the 
legislative history that the factors in § 107 are not exclusive. The text 
244. This delegation of authority from Congress gives courts a significant role in deter­
mining the practical scope of copyright protection. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5. 
245. See, e.g., Note, supra pote 10, at 1212 (proposing that courts deciding cases involv­
ing the re-writing of another author's copyrighted work consider time in the second fair use 
factor). 
246. See Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985); 2 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2, at 10:48. 
247. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2, at 10:48-10:49. But see William Landes, 
Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Ap­
proach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992) (arguing that unpublished works should have same 
level of protection as published works, in some circumstances). 
248. See, e.g. , Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (of­
fered to the public for free); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965, 
971 (9th Cir. 1992) (underlying work already sold). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. , 510 U.S. 569 (1994), implicitly recognized that the public nature of 
a work might be relevant in certain fair use cases. See id. at 586 (noting that this factor "is 
not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from 
the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, 
expressive works"). 
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expressly states that the factors to be considered "shall include," and 
nowhere suggests that these factors are an exclusive list. Indeed, the 
legislative history behind the Act clearly establishes that Congress 
meant to give courts broad discretion to consider additional factors 
not on the list.249 A later House Report, explaining the language in the 
statute stated: 
The Committee was concerned that as introduced, [the original lan­
guage] might have been inadvertently construed to discourage courts 
from looking at additional factors. The phrase "all the above factors" is 
intended to encompass the terms "including" and "such as" embodied in 
the preamble to Section 107, terms that are defined in Section 101 of title 
17 as being "illustrative and not limitative." Thus . . .  the courts must con­
sider all four statutory factors, but they may, at their discretion, consider 
any other factors they deem relevant. 250 
Courts have, over the years, taken Congress up on this grant of 
discretion, considering various factors not included in the list.251 These 
additional factors have included: the bad faith of the defendant (re­
sulting in a narrower scope of fair use ) ,252 acceptance of public funds 
by the author in creating the work (resulting in a broader scope of fair 
use),253 and industry custom.254 Thus, courts could, consistent with the 
text, legislative history, and case law, consider time as an additional, 
independent factor in fair use analysis.255 
249. See 4 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.0S[A], 
at 13-153 (2001) ("[T]he factors contained in Section 107 are merely by way of example, and 
are not an exhaustive enumeration. This means that factors other than those enumerated 
may prove to have a bearing upon the determination of fair use."); see also Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 570; Castle Rock Enter., Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 
1998); Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992); Maxtone­
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986). 
250. H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 9-10 (1992) (emphasis added). 
251. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63; Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 
527, 529 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Section 107 sets forth four nonexclusive factors."); DC Comics Inc. 
v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Section 107 
does not limit a court to consideration of only the four factors enumerated in the Statute."); 
2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2, at 10:18. See generally Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of 
Copyright, ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM No. 6, at 43 (1955). 
252. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986); Roy Ex­
port Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503 
F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff d, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.); cf Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 562-63. 
253. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n., 745 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
254. See, e.g., Triangle Pubs., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 
1176 (5th Cir. 1980). 
. 
255. Justin Hughes's proposal, by contrast, would fold consideration of time into the 
fourth fair use factor - the impact of the use on the potential market - by having courts 
look at how much longer the work will remain protected. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 
10. 
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In the end, then, the doctrinal argument in support of the proposal 
is remarkably simple and clear-cut. The text, legislative history, and 
case law on fair use clearly authorize courts to consider time, whether 
as part of the second factor or as an independent factor. The only real 
question is whether a court, in exercising its delegated discretion to 
consider time in fair use analysis, feels that such a consideration is 
warranted or desirable. As demonstrated in the previous part of this 
Article, very strong policy considerations support considering time as 
a factor in fair use analysis. This should provide courts with ample in­
centive to factor this into the consideration of fair use. 
Indeed, considering time as a factor in fair use would not require 
courts to depart dramatically from existing practice - courts already 
implicitly consider time in some fair use cases because a number of the 
existing fair use factors are influenced by the passage of time.256 For 
example, the unpublished status of a copyrighted work, which is rele­
vant in assessing the second factor (the nature of the work), will of­
ten257 be correlated with the age of the work. The Supreme Court case 
Harper & Row v. Nation,258 for example, involved a magazine's publi­
cation of as-yet-unpublished excerpts from former president Gerald 
Ford's biography. In that case, the Court clearly recognized that the 
age of the work had an impact on the various policy justifications fac­
toring into the fair use analysis.259 Other cases involving unpublished 
works address similar considerations.260 
Similarly, the fourth factor, the potential impact on the market, is 
often influenced by the passage of time. The younger the work, the 
greater potential there is for a market to be affected by a particular 
use. Conversely, the older the work, the less likely a market might be 
affected, particularly if the work is no longer being fully exploited or a 
license is difficult to secure.261 For example, copying an excerpt of an 
old, out-of-print book is unlikely to result in any appreciable harm to 
the market for that book.262 Thus, in many cases, the age of a work 
256. See O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 174 ("Moreover, at least some of these doctrines, 
particularly fair use, tend to be time-sensitive, allowing more use of information if relevant 
market indicators demonstrate that competition would be enhanced by permitting certain 
uses to proceed."). 
257. In some cases, a work might be unpublished for quite some time after creation. For 
example, a historical figure's private letters might be published many years after that figure's 
death. Thus, unpublished status is not perfectly correlated with time. 
258. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
259. Id. at 554-55. 
260. See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2(b ). 
261. See Robert Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1 ,  72-73 (1995) (arguing for greater scope of privilege to copy out-of-print 
books). 
262. Consideration of time is thus also consistent with the market-failure justification 
for fair use, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
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may be reflected in analysis of the market harm factor. True, this will 
not always be the case. For example, if a work is still being actively 
exploited late in its term (as is the case with, for example; Mickey 
Mouse), then time may not correlate with harm to the market. For 
every such case, however, there are many other cases where the cor­
relation will exist. 
The broader point is that express consideration of time would not 
be a dramatic departure from existing practice because courts already 
implicitly consider time in fair use analysis in some cases. It could be 
argued that, if courts already consider time in fair use analysis, there is 
no need for courts to consider time expressly. I address this argument 
in more detail in the last section of this Article, which deals with an­
ticipated objections to the proposal.263 For present p,urposes, let me 
simply note that the values supporting consideration of time are not 
always captured in the existing fair use analysis. Moreover, there are 
substantial additional advantages to considering time more expressly. 
The main point I wish to make here is simply that courts are already 
implicitly considering time in some fair use analysis, and that the pro­
posal in this Article would thus not be an unduly dramatic change. 
Finally, not only is consideration of time fully authorized by the 
statute, legislative history, and case law; it is also consistent with the 
underlying policy justifications supporting fair use. Conventionally, 
two main theories have been advanced to explain the role fair use 
plays in copyright law: the public benefit theory and the market failure 
theory. Under the public benefit theory, fair use is justified by the 
broader societal goal of promoting substantive values such as critique, 
research, education, and dissemination of knowledge.264 Under this 
theory, older works should generally be subject to greater fair use, 
since such works are more likely to form a part of our common cul­
tural heritage and be desirable subjects of research, critique, and 
study.265 Thus, broad fair use for older works supports these substan­
tive goals underlying fair use.266 
The proposal here is also consistent with the market-failure justifi­
cation for fair use.267 Under this justification, fair use should be permit-
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1620 (1982), 
since, as already discussed above, transactions costs can be expected to increase as time 
passes. 
263. See infra Section IV.B. 
264. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.2. 
265. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 59 ("Facili­
tation of the copying of old works, such as literary writings or recordings, is particularly im­
portant, though, for an old work which someone wishes to duplicate is likely to be of unique 
merit or to be needed for research or education, socially valuable activities."). 
266. Accord Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10. 
267. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1 (calling this the "private benefit" ap­
proach); Gordon, supra note 262. 
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ted for certain small-scale uses of works when the costs of obtaining a 
license for such use exceeds the value of that use (e.g. photocopying a 
single article or quoting a single phrase).268 Under this theory, fair use 
is a response to market failure. As already pointed out above, we can 
expect transactions costs to rise (and the market, therefore, to fail 
more frequently) as a work gets older.269 Conversely, where a work is 
comparatively younger, it will be relatively easy to identify the copy­
right owner and negotiate a license. Thus, consideration of time is 
broadly consistent (though again, not perfectly so) with this alternate 
justification for fair use. 
At the end of the day, the doctrinal argument in support of the 
proposal is remarkably strong. The copyright statute, legislative his­
tory, case law, and primary theories supporting the fair use doctrine all 
provide strong support for courts to consider time as a factor in fair 
use analysis. This strong doctrinal support, combined with the ex­
tremely strong policy arguments, should provide courts with all the 
reasons they need to consider time as a factor in fair use analysis. 
B. Dealing With Sonny Bono 
One doctrinal counter-argument to the proposal could be based on 
Congress's enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act (the "Bono Act").270 The argument would look something like 
this. Congress recently extended the term of copyright protection by 
an additional twenty years. In so doing, Congress expressly found that 
the incentive from an additional twenty years was justified for various 
reasons, including the increased useful life of works in the digital age 
and the need to harmonize U.S. and European copyright law. By tak­
ing time into account in fair use analysis and effectively reducing the 
scope of protection over time, courts would be frustrating this legisla­
tive intent. Thus, courts cannot, consistent with the recent term exten­
sion, consider time as a factor in fair use analysis. 
This argument is weak on a number of fronts. First, the argument 
finds no support as a matter of statutory interpretation. The plain text 
of the term extension says nothing at all about fair use and what courts 
should consider in fair use analysis.271 Its limited and focused purpose 
is to extend the term by an additional twenty years, and consideration 
of time in fair use analysis is in no way inconsistent with the plain 
terms of the extension. Thus, the plain meaning of the extension does 
268. See Gordon, supra note 262. 
269. See supra Section II.A. But see Bell, supra note 114, at 586 (suggesting that the 
Internet may reduce transaction costs on-line and thus lead to a narrower scope of fair use). 
270. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304. 
271. See id. 
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not foreclose consideration of time. Second, no specific intent of 
Congress would be frustrated by consideration of time in fair use. That 
is, Congress did not, in passing the extension, specifically intend that 
courts should refuse to consider time or freeze the scope of fair use. 
This is not surprising, since courts have thus far not explicitly consid­
ered time in their fair use analysis. Thus, Congress could not have an­
ticipated or had any specific intention about such practice. 
Third, the more general intent of Congress to extend the term 
would not be frustrated by interpreting fair use to incorporate consid­
eration of time. In enacting the extension, Congress did not intend to 
shrink or freeze the scope of fair use or limit the considerations avail­
able to courts under section 107. Rather, Congress intended merely to 
extend protection - whatever the substantive scope of that protection 
- another twenty years.272 Considering time as a factor in fair use 
analysis thus does not conflict with the extension of the term, because 
it only affects the scope, not the duration of the copyright. Authors 
will still be entitled to an additional twenty years of copyright protec­
tion. However, that additional twenty years will, like any other twenty 
year period of the copyright term, be subject to whatever limitations 
courts allow under the fair use defense. 
True, it would clearly be inconsistent with the intent and policy of 
the Act if a court expressly deprived an author of all protection for the 
additional twenty-year period. And if this proposal aimed to accom­
plish the same goal, albeit not explicitly, then a strong argument could 
be made that the intent of Congress was being frustrated. However, 
the proposal here does not deprive authors of all protection for the ex­
tension period. Indeed, authors will still have a great degree of protec­
tion.273 They will still have full rights during that period to prevent 
copying, public distribution, public display, public performance, and 
the creation of derivative works. Like rights during the term more 
generally such rights will simply, be subject to limitation by fair use. 
Nor, as developed in more detail below, is the proposal even targeted 
expressly at the extension term. Rather, the proposaris  a change in the 
scope of fair use that would apply over the entire length of the copy­
right term and might even result in increased protection earlier in a 
copyright's term. The proposal is truly aimed more at scope rather 
than duration, and it is not in any way inconsistent with Congress's in­
tent in enacting the Bono Act.274 
272. See H.R. REP. No. 105-452 (1998). 
273. The Sonny Bono Act does include an exception to infringement for libraries during 
the extension period, "for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research," under certain 
circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 108(2)(h)(l). 
274. See Garon, supra note 36, at 600 (suggesting that Congress either repeal the exten­
sion or modify the extension so that protection is more limited during the extension period). 
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Finally, even if there were some modest amount of tension with 
congressional intent, good reasons exist for interpreting the Bono Act 
narrowly and not extending its preemptive effect beyond the literal 
words of the enactment itself. A number of commentators analyzing 
theories of statutory interpretation have suggested that courts should 
subject statutes to narrower construction when the statutes result from 
systemic or structural imbalances in lobbying power.275 Under this 
view, courts engaging in interpretation have a role in policing the leg­
islative process, to check such imbalances and to ensure that public­
regarding values. are represented. As described above, the Bono Act 
bears all of the hallmarks of a statute enacted largely in response to 
unequal lobbying power.276 Accordingly, under this interpretive view, 
the scope of the extension should not be read more broadly than nec­
essary .277 
This view is, naturally, not uncontroversial. Others have argued 
that legislation represents little more than the bargain struck by com­
peting interest groups lobbying for legislation, and the role of the 
courts is to enforce this bargain.278 Thus, courts should try to effectuate 
the intent of the parties to the agreement and refrain from any inter­
pretation of statutes that would frustrate this intent. Under this view, 
the injection of public-regarding values from outside the legislative 
bargain struck by competing lobbying groups would be an illegitimate 
exercise ·of judicial power. Applied to the proposal in this Article, the 
argument would be that the Bono Act should be interpreted to bar the 
proposal, since the parties who lobbied for the extension clearly ex-
275. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 131 (1991); see also WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 81-90 (2000); William Eskridge, Jr., Poli­
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statlltory Interpretation, 74 
VA. L. REV. 275, 303-05 (1988); Macey, supra note 214, at 224; Netanel, supra note 9, at 66 
n.278; Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
471 (1989). The same argument has been made in support of calls for the courts to strike 
down such laws as unconstitutional. See Merges, supra note 76, at 2238-39 ("I am only argu­
ing that, when an imbalance is clear, courts ought to treat it as relevant. In a close case, 
where a statute seems close to a line drawn by the Constitution, it should be relevant that 
only industry groups were represented during the drafting of the statute. Not determinative; 
but relevant. A copyright term incapable of serving as an incentive at any plausible discount 
rate . . .  in these and similar cases, an inquiry into the legislative process seems a relevant 
consideration. In a close case, that inquiry should tip the balance."); Merges & Reynolds, 
supra note 76, at 59. 
276. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 215-20; 
supra Section 11.D. 
277. See Merges, supra note 76, at 2238; O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 169 (arguing that 
courts interpreting intellectual property statutes can play a role in compensating for imper­
fectio?s in the legislative process). 
278. See Easterbrook, supra note 214, 1346-47; Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group 
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial. Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-59 (1991); Robert 
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 345-47 (1988). 
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pected and intended for the additional twenty years ·of protection to 
be full and unaffected by the passage of time. 
A lengthy discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Suffice it to say that I find generally more persuasive the in­
terpretive stance adopted by the commentators arguing for stricter 
scrutiny of statutes resulting from systematic imbalances in lobbying 
power. Although one must certainly be careful to distinguish cases 
where such imbalances are systematic from cases where imbalances 
are simply part of the regular political process, the evidence suggests 
that the recent extension of copyright protection is not a case that is 
close to the line.279 In any event, even under the interest-group bargain 
theory there is little evidence that Congress had any specific or general 
intent regarding the scope of copyright protection, and certainly such 
an interpretation is not found anywhere in the text of the bargain. 
Finally, no real tension exists between Congressional intent (of what­
ever kind) and this proposal, since the proposal in this Article deals 
with the scope of copyright protection, not its duration. 
N. THE PROPOSAL IN DETAIL 
Having constructed both the theoretical and doctrinal arguments 
in support of the proposal, I now turn to the specifics of the proposal. 
The proposal itself is easy to state: courts should consider time as a 
factor in fair use analysis. What remains is an elaboration of what the 
proposal means and what sorts of concrete results would follow from 
its adoption. In particular, how might copyright law be different if we 
adopted this proposal? As the analysis below will show, consideration 
of time would improve fair use analysis by permitting courts to tailor 
the defense more closely to the justifications underlying copyright law 
generally. 
A. Some Examples 
As described above, the most straightforward manner of incorpo­
rating time as a factor in fair use analysis would be to consider time 
expressly as one of the many independent factors in fair use analysis. 
Since each of the factors contributes to the totality of the circum­
stances used to evaluate whether a use is "fair," time would not be 
dispositive in and of itself.280 Rather, a court would still consider all of 
the factors in fair use analysis, and consideration of time would simply 
be folded into the broader analysis. At the same time, the impact of 
279. See supra Section 11.D. 
280. See, e.g. , Note, supra note 10, at 1213 (making similar point with respect to proposal 
that courts consider time in deciding cases involving the re-writing of another author's copy­
righted work). 
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time on fair use would not be trivial. Indeed, consideration of time 
would greatly increase the scope of fair use at the end of the copyright 
term and perhaps decrease the scope of such use at the beginning of 
the term. 
1. Transformative Uses 
Some examples will help clarify how time might affect the scope of 
fair use. Take the recent, much-cited dispute involving publication of 
the book The Wind Done Gone.281 In The Wind Done Gone, the 
author, Alice Randall, created a fictional work based on Margaret 
Mitchell's Gone With the Wind.282 Randall re-told aspects of the story 
from the perspective of a woman named Cyanara, the daughter of a 
slave living on the plantation. Randall intended for the book to serve 
as a critique of Gone With the Wind's depiction of slavery in the Civil 
War era.283 In so doing, she appropriated many characters (such as 
Scarlett O'Hara, Rhett Butler, Ashley Wilkes, and Mammy),284 the 
general plot, some dialogue, and major scenes from Gone With the 
Wind.285 
Upon learning of the book, the trustees of the Margaret Mitchell 
trust sued Randall for copyright infringement. The federal district 
court ruled in favor of the trust, enjoining publication of the work.286 In 
reaching this result, the court rejected Randall's fair use argument, 
primarily based upon the commercial nature of the new work and the 
impact on the potential market for sequels or other versions of Gone 
With the Wind.287 This decision, however, was reversed on appeal,288 
the appellate court holding that Randall's fair use defense was likely 
to succeed and so publication of her work should not be enjoined.289 In 
281. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). This spe· 
cific example has been developed in Note, supra note 10, at 1193. It also has been a popular 
example in much recent copyright literature. See, e.g. , LESSIG, supra note 121, at 198-99; 
Netanel, supra note 9; Note, supra note 10; Note, supra note 165. 
282. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936). 
283. For a similar situation involving a re-telling of Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, see 
Peter Applebome, Pact Reached on U.S. Edition of "Lolita" Retelling, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
1999, at El. 
284. These characters were in many cases re-named, although clearly with reference to 
the original (e.g. Rhett Butler was renamed R.B., etc.). Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267. 
285. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368-69 (N.D. Ga. 
2001), vacated by 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). 
286. Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386. 
287. Id. at 1379, 1 382. 
288. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
289. The appellate court initially vacated the injunction on the grounds that it repre­
sented an unconstitutional prior restraint. Suntrust Bank, 252 F.3d. at 1166. It subsequently 
supplemented its initial order with a more comprehensive opinion on the substantive copy­
right issue. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259. 
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applying the traditional four factors of the fair use test, the court held 
that the use was clearly transformative because it sought to parody 
and critique the original, and that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that the market for Gone With the Wind or any de­
rivative works would be harmed by Randall's use.290 
Consideration of time as a factor in this case would have made the 
ultimate outcome easier to reach.291 A court considering time would 
have noted that the original Gone With the Wind was published in 
1936, and was nearing the end of its copyright term.292 This means that 
Margaret Mitchell and her estate had already had more than sixty 
years of exclusive right to sell the original work, to authorize new ver­
sions, and to exploit it through derivative works such as movies293 and 
sequels.294 By any measure, both Mitchell and the estate had been am­
ply compensated for the work.295 At the same time, Gone With the 
Wind has, over time, achieved a prominence in our culture that makes 
it a desirable target for re-invention and re-telling. Indeed, the book is 
one of the best-selling works of all time, second only to the Bible.296 
Accordingly, the scope of permissible transformative re-telling should 
be much greater now, more than sixty years after original publication. 
Of course, consideration of time would need to be weighed along 
with the other fair use factors. Thus, in this case, time would merely be 
another factor weighing in favor of fair use, along with the transforma­
tive nature of the use. Combined with the other factors, consideration 
of time would have reinforced the ultimate outcome. On the other 
hand, one could imagine a different set of facts under which time 
would not be sufficient to lead to a finding of fair use. For example, 
say the case had involved the defendant selling exact, unauthorized 
copies of the original novel. The age of this work would still support a 
finding of fair use, but would be outweighed by the other four factors 
that would all point against fair use. Thus, time would not by itself be 
dispositive, though it would affect the analysis. 
290. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267-76. 
291. See Note, supra note 10, at 1211-12. 
292. The court in Suntrust Bank briefly noted that Gone With the Wind was approaching 
the end of its copyright term, but only in mentioning that future derivative works would only 
be protected as to their original contributions, and that elements drawn from the underlying 
work would pass into the public domain. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1275. 
293. See GONE WITH THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1939). 
294. See ALEXANDRA RIPLEY, SCARLETT: THE SEQUEL TO MARGARET MITCHELL'S 
GONE WITH THE WIND (1992). 
295. See Note, supra note 10, at 1211-12 (noting that the novel "has sold tens of millions 
of copies, and was made into a film that, in inflation-adjusted dollars, is the highest-grossing 
movie of all time."). 
296. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259. 
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Consideration of time as a factor might also mean more protection 
in the initial years of a work's life. That is, including time in the fair 
use calculus does not necessarily result in less overall protection for 
copyrighted works. Indeed, it might mean even more protection in the 
initial years of a work, when the value of such protection is greatest. 
For example, imagine the same set of facts in the Wind Done Gone 
case, but applied to the most recent Harry Potter novel.297 Say an 
author decides to publish his own version of a Harry Potter novel, but 
from the perspective of one of the minor characters in the book. And 
suppose that this perspective is a critical one, highlighting certain un­
desirable assumptions underlying the book. 
Even though the facts might be nearly identical to those in the 
Wind Done Gone case, considering time as a factor could lead a court 
to find no fair use. Here, the work would have only been published for 
a couple of years. Accordingly, the potential impact on creative incen­
tives is much greater. The original author would not have had signifi­
cant time to exploit the work commercially298 or to fully realize the ar­
tistic vision underlying it.299 Moreover, the interest in controlling 
derivative works is much stronger, since licensing derivatives takes 
both time and effort, and only a short period of time has passed.300 
And even though the Harry Potter books have garnered much atten­
tion, they have not yet attained iconic stature nor embedded them­
selves as firmly- into our cultural consciousness as Gone With the Wind. 
Thus consideration of time could well lead to a different conclusion in 
a case involving a younger work. At the same time, the exact same 
facts occurring eighty years from now would likely lead to a different 
result. 
Or take another example: Mickey Mouse. In the late 1970s, Disney 
sued the publishers of a counter-culture comic book, titled Air Pirates, 
which depicted Mickey and Minnie Mouse engaging in drug-smuggling 
and various unseemly activities.301 Although the court in that case held 
that the comic book constituted a parody sufficient to trigger a possi­
ble fair use defense, the court ultimately concluded that the use was 
not fair, based upon a weighing of the four factors.302 If the court had 
297. See Note, supra note 10, at 1213 (mentioning precisely this example and arguing 
that this would be a closer case). The Harry Potter books themselves were the subject of a 
copyright dispute. See Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
298. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 171 (suggesting, for younger works, some kind 
of "sharing" arrangement); Note, supra note 10, at 1212. 
299. A number of much-anticipated sequels are on their way. Cf. Hughes, Recoding, 
supra note 152, at 927 (arguing that consumers have an interest in having stable meanings). 
300. See, e.g. , Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
301. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1 132 (1979). 
302. Id. at 758. 
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considered time as a factor in the fair use analysis, the result might 
well have been different. A court would have noted that Disney had 
by that time enjoyed more than forty years of copyright protection for 
Mickey Mouse,303 a significant time period within which to earn a re­
turn and develop various sequels and other properties based on the 
original creative work. Moreover, Mickey Mouse had attained a cer­
tain status and cultural significance.304 This, weighed against the vari­
ous other factors, could well have been sufficient to tip the case and 
result in a finding for the defendants. By the same token, had the same 
case arisen in the 1930s, shortly after the initial creation of the work, 
the analysis suggested here might well have led to a different result. 
Finally, consider an example of a derivative, but non-critical, use. 
In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing,305 the owners of the 
copyright in the popular television comedy Seinfeld sued an author for 
publishing a book called The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, which contained 
trivia questions about facts from the television sitcom. The Second 
Circuit held that the book was a derivative work and rejected a fair 
use argument.306 The rejection of the fair use defense was based in part 
on the relatively well-established rule that, in assessing the harm to the 
market, a court should look not only to the market for the work itself 
(in this case the television show), but also the market for derivative 
works (such as books based upon the television show).307 This consid­
eration of the derivative market is supported by the idea that a copy­
right owner should be given an opportunity to exploit the work 
through licensing or the creation of derivative works. At the same 
time, however, this right permits copyright holders to limit efforts by 
others to build upon the work, raising concerns that the original 
author may use this right to suppress or limit creative transformation. 
Consideration of time in such derivative-works cases would permit 
courts to vary the scope of this right over time and thereby achieve a 
finer balance between these competing concerns. Thus, where the 
work is older, noncritical derivative works should have freer rein, 
since the copyright owner will have had ample opportunity to develop 
such works on his or her own, and the work will be an attractive sub­
ject for adaptation. Moreover, the incentive impact of finding less pro-
303. Actually, the air pirates parody of Mickey Mouse was based on a later version of 
Mickey Mouse (with features differing somewhat from the original Steamboat Willie), so the 
actual time period might be less than forty years. 
304. See Gordon, supra note 114, at 1603; Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: 
Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 434 
(1994) ("[O]nce Mickey Mouse becomes a cultural icon, we need to be able to talk about 
him, sometimes irreverently."). 
305. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
306. Id. at 135 
307. Id. at 144-46. 
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tection will be minimal. Where a work is relatively young, however, 
the scope of such use would be comparatively less.308 Thus, considera­
tion of time in the Seinfeld case would have lent additional support 
toward a finding of no fair use, since the works are so new. However, 
the exact same facts applied to an older work would probably reach a 
different result. For example, a Gone With the Wind Aptitude Test, 
employing the exact same format as the Seinfeld Aptitude Test, would 
probably constitute fair use.309 
Many other actual cases illustrate the same overall point: that con­
sideration of time could change the results in a significant number of 
fair use decisions. For example, recent fair use cases involving older 
copyrighted works include claimed fair uses of the following works: 
the movie character James Bond (who first appeared in film in 
1962);310 the works of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard (written in 
the 1950s);31 1  The Cat . in the Hat by Dr. Seuss (published in the 
1950s);312 the Star Trek television series (first aired in 1966);313 the 
Godzilla movies (created in 1954);314 and the films of Laurel and 
Hardy (from 1929).315 In each of these cases, the age of the work would 
have lent additional support to the fair use argument, and would likely 
have changed the ultimate results in a number of them. These exam­
ples illustrate how time would affect the scope of copyright protection 
for older works. 
In response to the above examples, it could be argued that the 
proposal gets it exactly backwards by affording potentially more pro-
308. Note that this analysis does not say anything about whether the case was rightly 
decided as an initial matter (particularly on the derivative work issue). Only that the relative 
youth of the underlying work would have undercut the fair use argument. See Ginsburg, 
supra note 154 (discussing these cases). 
309. Or, for a concrete recent example, consider Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 
F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 1998), which involved a book containing facts, pictures, 
and plot summaries from the Godzilla movies, which were first shown in the 1950s. 
310. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1299-
1301 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (no fair use for commercial employing a James-Bond-like character, 
where the first Bond film appeared in 1962). 
311 .  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 
1231, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (no fair use for posting the writings of L. Ron Hubbard, which 
were written in the early 1950s). 
312. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(no fair use of Dr. Seuss style to retell O.J. Simpson double-murder story, where Dr. Seuss 
books first appeared in the 1950s). 
313. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 1 1  F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (no fair use for Star Trek fan book called The Joy of Trek where television series first 
appeared in 1966). 
314. Toho Co. , 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (no fair use for book containing facts, pictures, 
and plot summaries from the Godzilla movies, where Godzilla created in 1954). 
315. Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), 
vacated mem. 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir. 1999) (no fair use for commercial use of colorized photo 
of Laurel and Hardy, which was taken in 1929). 
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tection for younger works. That is, the ability to contest or challenge 
the cultural meaning of a work through parody or transformation is 
most important early in the life of a work, and insulating the work 
from such early critique would unfairly silence or hinder competing 
perspectives. Thus, for example, a parody of the Harry Potter books 
or the Star Wars films might be most appropriate now, when these 
works are prominent in the public consciousness. Limiting such trans­
formative uses to the end of the copyright term risks permitting such 
uses only when they are far less relevant. 
As an initial matter, the proposal advanced here would not com­
pletely insulate newer works from parody or critique. Time would only 
be one of several factors in fair use analysis and could well be out­
weighed in many cases (for example, where the use is particularly 
transformative, and where the impact on the market is likely to be 
minimal). As in all fair use cases, much would depend on the facts. 
Thus parody would still be available for newer works and others 
would still be permitted to contest the preferred meanings of new 
works. The broader point, however, is that the scope of such use 
would be comparatively less than that applied to older works.316 
Moreover, such a result is not problematic once one acknowledges not 
only the societal interest in different perspectives, but also the copy­
right owner's interests in obtaining a return for her creative labor and 
in further developing the artistic vision underlying the original work. 
By altering the scope of protection over time, the proposal permits 
these interests to be balanced in a more nuanced fashion. 
Not only do the above examples, as argued earlier, fit both copy­
right doctrine and theory, they also seem quite consistent with com­
mon sense and our intuitions. Even given identical facts, it seems intui­
tively right that the scope of fair use for Gone With the Wind should be 
greater than the scope of fair use for Harry Potter. It seems intuitively 
appropriate that the ability of third parties to re-cast, transform, and 
adapt older works should generally be greater than the corresponding 
right to re-cast newer works. The main difference between these two 
examples is simply time and what time represents with respect to 
many of the policy justifications underlying copyright law. 
2. Excerpts 
Although the transformative uses discussed above probably pres­
ent the strongest case in support of the proposal, nontransformative 
uses would also benefit from consideration of time. Consider, for ex­
ample, the use of excerpts from copyrighted works, that is, incorpo­
rating quotes and passages, sometimes extensively, from other works. 
316. For example, derivative works that are only minimally parodic might be more per­
missible for older works and less so for newer ones. 
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Under the proposal, the ability of subsequent authors to incorporate 
excerpts from other works would be affected by the age of the work. 
So, taking the facts from Harper & Row,317 the fact that the work was 
new would have weighed against a finding of fair use. True, as already 
discussed, the Court implicitly recognized the impact of time in its 
general fair use analysis.318 Recognition of time would, however, have 
been express under the proposal in this Article, thus providing an 
easier route to the Court's ultimate result.319 
At the same time, the result might well have been different under 
this proposal if the case had arisen fifty years later. That is, assume 
that a news magazine wished to reproduce the exact same quotes, not 
to "scoop" the initial publication of the work, but as part of a histori­
cal analysis of some of the events described in the memoir. With these 
same facts, consideration of time would greatly support a finding of 
fair use, since much ti�e would have passed since the original creation 
of the work. True, application of standard fair use analysis might also 
reach the same result. For example, the fourth factor in this case might 
well flip to favor the defendant because licensing revenues from the 
initial publication would not be an issue.320 However, other licensing 
revenue would still be a concern. Thus, it is not entirely clear that the 
result would be different under standard fair use analysis. Considera­
tion of time, however, would likely lead to a different result. 
Along these same lines, consideration of time could shed light on 
the use of excerpts of unpublished letters and papers in subsequent 
works. In a number of cases, courts have grappled with the fair use 
status of excerpts of unpublished works in unauthorized biographies, 
like the publication of personal letters in an unauthorized biography 
of J.D. Salinger.321 As a general matter, courts have given significant 
weight to the unpublished status of the work in rejecting claims of fair 
use.322 This is in part out of the concern with financial incentives dis-
317. Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
318. See id. at 551-55. 
319. Of course, there could well be cases where excerpting is still justified even for new 
works. For example, where an excerpt is necessary to comment on an issue that is particu­
larly timely or newsworthy. Although the age of the work would tilt against fair use, other 
considerations might well outweigh that factor. 
320. See Landes, supra note 247, at 111.  
321.  Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (no fair use of excerpts 
of private letters of J.D. Salinger in an unauthorized biography), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 
(1987); see also New Era Publ'ns Int'! v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) (no 
fair use for unflattering biography of L. Ron. Hubbard which used excerpts from unpub­
lished letters and diaries), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). But see Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 
Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107). See generally Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of 
History: The Second Circuit Struggles With Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 12 
(1989). 
322. See, e.g., Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95-99; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2(b ). 
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cussed above,323 but in part also out of an apparent concern with the 
privacy interests of the individuals.324 Historians and other scholars 
have expressed concern that these decisions might hinder their ability 
to study and write about figures of historical interest.325 
Consideration of time would provide .a way of balancing these 
competing interests. In such cases, the unpublished status of a work 
would continue to weigh against a finding of fair use, but the age of 
the work would also factor into the analysis. Thus, where the unpub­
lished work is relatively new, consideration of time would reinforce a 
finding of no fair use. So, for example, there would be more limited 
fair use of recent unpublished letters.326 However, where the unpub­
lished work is older, consideration of time would weigh in favor of fair 
use, counteracting the unpublished status of the work. Thus unpub­
lished letters dating from the 1940s would be subject to greater fair use 
than recent letters. Again, this result finds support in the general poli­
cies underlying copyright law. When an unpublished letter or manu­
script is new, the author's interests, whether financial or privacy­
related, are generally the greatest. As the decades pass, these interests 
wane, while the broader societal interest in studying, reporting, and 
disseminating excerpts from these works increases. Again, time would 
permit a more nuanced consideration of these underlying copyright 
interests. 
3. Personal Uses 
The examples above all involve the use of a work by a subsequent 
author. The proposal in this Article, however, could also be applied to 
personal uses by consumers as well. Examples of this type of use in­
clude taping songs from a CD for use in one's car stereo (so-called 
"space shifting"), taping on-air television broadcasts for later viewing 
(so-called "time shifting"), and photocopying newspaper or magazine 
articles for personal use or study. The same basic rules discussed 
above would apply to these cases. Thus, where a work is relatively old, 
courts would permit a greater degree of personal copying. Conversely, 
where a work is new, courts would permit comparatively less freedom 
for personal copying. 
323. See Landes, supra note 247, at 1 1 1  (analyzing economic interests). 
324. See Jon 0. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.­
VLA J.L. & ARTS 459 (1988). 
325. See David Kaplan, The End of History?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80. See gen­
erally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299 
(1991). 
326. Again, this is a generalization. There might well be cases where such letters are so 
newsworthy (for example, a private letter of a public government official concerning a mat­
ter of public interest) that these factors are outweighed by the other fair use factors. 
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Again, consideration of time would not by itself be dispositive. 
Thus, the other factors might outweigh time or dictate the same result 
whether time is considered or not. Indeed, since some of the uses may 
already be privileged by the fair use defense or under other statutory 
exemptions,327 consideration of time might not materially change the 
results.328 For example, take the question of personal copying of televi­
sion broadcasts for purposes of time-shifting, the issue raised in Sony 
v. Universal City Studios.329 The proposal in this Article suggests that 
the scope of fair use for such broadcasts should depend on the age of 
the copyrighted work. , Thus, time-shifting of older shows from the 
1950s would be subject to greater privilege than similar copying of 
very recent shows. However, since the Supreme Court held in Sony 
that time shifting in general is fair use, consideration of time would not 
add anything to the analysis.330 
In cases closer to the line, however, time would make more of a 
difference. For example, consider private taping of on-air television 
broadcasts, not for time-shifting, but instead for building up a home 
library for repeat viewing. The Supreme Court in Sony expressly de­
clined to rule on this issue,331 and the fair use status of this activity is 
very much in question. Or consider personal taping of CDs borrowed 
from friends for purposes of building up a collection. Time could well 
make a difference in the fair use analysis. The ability to make personal 
library copies of older works, say music from the 1930s {for example, 
an old recording of a Cole Porter song) or classic television shows 
from the 1950s (for example, the Honeymooners) or old magazine ar­
ticles (for example, L ife magazine), would be greater than the right to 
make similar copies of newer works, such as the new Eminem CD or 
the latest episode of Friends.332 
327. See, e.g. , Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000) (privileging cer­
tain personal copies of musical works). 
328. Note there is disagreement over the validity of this type of "consumptive" fair use. 
See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
1 (2000). 
329. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
330. That is, assuming the Supreme Court does not see fit to revisit the issue. Note that 
this is not an objection to the proposal in general, since time in this respect is no different 
from the other fair use factors, which might or might not figure heavily in the fair use analy­
sis, depending on the specific facts of the case. 
331 .  464 U.S. at 421. 
332. This argument assumes these works are not copy-protected. If they are, there may 
be a limit on the ability of the individual to exercise his or her fair use rights. This limit 
would be both technological, in the form of the copy-protection, and legal, since circum­
venting the copy protection would give rise to a violation of the Digital Millennium Copy­
right Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000). The DMCA would be violated even if 
the individual had a fair use privilege to copy the protected work, since the DMCA, unlike 
the Copyright Act more generally, contains no general fair use exception. See Universal Stu­
dios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 1 1 1  F. Supp. 2d 294, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
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Again, this would be justified by the fact that the ex ante impact of 
such copying. on incentives would be much less for the older work. In 
addition, the older work is more likely to be a work of historical or 
cultural interest, such that we would want to encourage wide dissemi­
nation. Finally, the costs of. securing licenses for small-scale personal 
copying would be expected to increase for older works, and indeed 
might be prohibitively expensive for works that are no longer actively 
distributed. This last consideration is particularly important given that 
the costs of seeking permission to engage in personal copying could, 
for older works, easily exceed the value of the use.333 Conversely, these 
interests have comparatively less relevance for newer copyrighted 
works. Time would again serve as a proxy for these interests and per­
mit tailoring of copyright scope over time for personal copying. 
Consideration of time also has the unexpected benefit of shedding 
some interesting light on a long-standing puzzle involving the intersec­
tion of personal copying and new technology. The case American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco334 nicely illustrates this puzzle.335 In that 
case, a number of scientific journal publishers brought suit against 
Texaco for its practice of systematically circulating these journals 
among its research scientists and permitting them to make photocop­
ies of articles for their files. The court in American Geophysical re­
jected a fair use defense.336 In so doing, the court pointed to the avail­
ability of licenses offered by the Copyright Clearance Center, a rights­
management organization.337 
American Geophysical points to a puzzle within the influential 
market failure justification for fair use. As described above, under this 
justification, fair use should generally be permitted in cases where the 
cost of securing a license exceeds the value of the use.338 Under such 
circumstances, fair use is an appropriate response to market failure 
caused by the existence of transaction costs. However, this justification 
is complicated by the potential emergence of private rights-clearance 
organizations that could reduce the costs of licensing. Examples of 
333. See Gordon, supra note 243. 
334. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
335. Other examples of this issue include William & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (similar 
photocopying case, though reaching different result), and the copy shop cases, see, e.g., 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1 156 (1997); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 
1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights 
and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
115, 131-32 (1997) (discussing the cases). 
336. 60 F.3d at 918-32. 
337. Id. at 929-31. 
338. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1; Gordon, supra note 243. 
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such organizations include BMP39 and ASCAP340 for music licensing 
and the Copyright Clearance Center for journal copies. These organi­
zations reduce the costs of licensing by providing blanket licenses that 
permit certain uses of works and by monitoring these uses for compli­
ance with the terms of the licensing agreements.341 Where such organi­
zations exist, as in American Geophysical, the market-failure justifica­
tion for fair use may be undercut since licenses are easily available. 
The puzzle arises when courts are forced to deal with fair uses in­
volving new copying technologies. For example, in Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. ,342 the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether private taping of television broadcasts for later. viewing con­
stituted fair use. Under the market failure view, such taping would be 
strongly supported given that the cost of an individual securing a li­
cense to engage in such use exceeded the value of that use. However, 
since the decision was handed down only shortly after the VCR was 
introduced to the market, no organizations had yet arisen to issue such 
licenses. The decision in Sony thus effectively prevented any such or­
ganizations from ever arising.343 At the same time, it is quite possible 
that such organizations would never have arisen, given the economics 
particular to that market. Thus, a court presented with a fair use issue 
involving new technology is forced at the outset to make a prediction 
based on inadequate information that might have substantial effects 
on the structure of an emerging market.344 
One response to this puzzle is that courts should err on the side of 
rejecting claims of fair use, since this gives private licensing institutions 
a chance to develop.345 Since a decision permitting fair use will neces­
sarily prevent the creation of ·private institutions, courts should be 
wary of making such a determination without more evidence that 
there exist structural barriers to the creation of such institutions.346 
This suggestion, however, is still less-than-optimal, because there may 
339. Broadcast Music, Inc. 
340. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. 
341. See Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
342. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
343. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131; cf 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1, at 10:7. 
344. See Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in 
Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 209, 210-17 (1985). An analogous (though inverse) situation is raised by predictions 
that the Internet will greatly reduce transaction costs associated with licensing uses through 
micro-payments. See Bell, supra note 114; Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted 
Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997). 
345. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131. 
346. See id. 
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be a cost associated with foregone uses if such institutions do not in 
fact develop. Individuals will be barred from exercising certain fair 
uses, and no low-cost licensing mechanisms will permit them to obtain 
access. Moreover, technology and market responses are notoriously 
difficult to predict,347 and courts are often not in the best position to 
accurately assess the potential for such institutions to develop. 
A more satisfactory answer is provided by consideration of time in 
fair use analysis. By considering time, a court could adjust its finding 
of fair use depending on when the issue was presented to it. Thus, if a 
technology is entirely new and it is possible that private licensing 
schemes might develop, a court could find no fair use in order to give 
institutions the chance to develop such schemes.348 By contrast, if a 
technology has been in place for a long time and no such institutions 
or licensing schemes have developed, then a court should be more 
willing to consider a fair use argument, since the failure of such institu­
tions to develop would be evidence that the market will not solve the 
transactions cost problem on its owh.349 Thus, consideration of time 
would permit courts to get out of the bind that they are in when faced 
with fair use claims involving new technologies. Note that in this case, 
time is being considered, not with respect to the underlying copy­
righted works, but rather with respect to the technology. By opening 
up fair use analysis and making it sensitive to the relevance and impact 
of time, the proposal would provide this additional benefit.350 
4. Reverse Engineering 
In discussing examples of cases where the proposal in this Article 
could be usefully applied, it is important also to recognize cases where 
the application of the proposal would not be appropriate. One such 
category of cases involves reverse engineering of computer software, 
347. Jack Valenti, the chief executive of the Motion Picture Association of America, 
famously testified before Congress in 1982 that "the VCR is to the American film producer 
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705, 97th 
Cong. 8 (1982). 
348. Note that this result is based purely on the market failure view of fair use. The 
public benefit view of fair use might still support a finding of fair use under certain such cir­
cumstances. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131. 
349. See Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New 
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 145, 1 183 (2000) (considering 
but rejecting such a proposal because of lack of a doctrinal method of implementation); 
Merges, supra note 335, at 131 (making just thls proposal). 
350. The discussion above is intended primarily to highlight one possible additional 
benefit of considering time as a factor in fair use analysis. The broader and complex issue of 
how copyright law more generally should respond to changes in copying technology is be­
yond the scope of this Article. Further study of how this proposal might affect this broader 
issue is warranted. 
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and it is sufficiently important to warrant at least a brief express men­
tion here. Computer software is protected by copyright law as a liter­
ary work.351 However, copyright law has not been an easy fit for soft­
ware,352 since software contains functional elements which copyright 
law is not designed to protect. Thus courts have had to adapt existing 
copyright doctrines to the peculiarities of computer software, permit­
ting them to protect the creative elements while preventing them from 
unintentionally protecting the functional aspects of software and 
thereby reducing competition and innovation. 
One way courts have done this is through the fair use doctrine. In 
particular, the courts have established a fair use privilege to copy 
software for purposes of reverse engineering in order to make com­
patible products.353 Thus, for example, a video game manufacturer is 
permitted to make copies of a console manufacturer's operating sys­
tem software in order to study it and make compatible games.354 Simi­
larly, under certain circumstances, an applications developer should be 
permitted to reverse engineer an operating system in order to develop 
a compatible program. This privilege is considered necessary to pre­
vent copyright owners from using copyright law to hinder desirable 
competition. 
The proposal in this Article should not be read to support an ar­
gument that reverse engineering should be greater for older works and 
more limited for new works. This is because the justifications sup­
porting the proposal simply do not apply to the unique circumstances 
of computer software. First, the current copyright term vastly exceeds 
the useful life of computer software. Whatever may be said about the 
appropriateness of a life-plus-seventy term for copyrighted works in 
general, it is impossible not to recognize that such a term is far too 
long for computer software, which rarely has a useful life beyond ten 
years. Thus, to the extent that many of the justifications supporting the 
proposal rely on changes that occur over the decades of the copyright 
351. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 
1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983). 
352. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'), 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., 
concurring) ("Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw puz­
zle whose pieces do not quite fit."); Computer Assocs. lnt'I v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d 
Cir. 1992) ("Generally, we think that copyright registration - with its indiscriminating 
availability - is not ideally suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of computer 
science."). 
353. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993); see also DSC Commu­
nications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software 
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and 
the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Tech­
nologies, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The 
Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
354. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520. 
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term, these justifications are inapplicable to the much shorter life of 
computer software.355 
Second, many of the justifications for the proposal are based on 
the expressive and creative nature of copyrighted works. That is, the 
justifications based on the desire for transformation, re-use, and re­
imagining of copyrighted works are peculiar to expressive works that 
communicate meaning to an audience. By contrast, computer software 
is expressive in only the most limited sense. Its primary value is not in 
the creative expression embodied in the program code, since the code 
itself does ·not communicate directly to the audience. Rather the pri­
mary value is found in the functional aspects of the program.356 Thus, 
to the extent that computer software does not involve these expressive 
considerations, the corresponding justifications simply do not apply. 
Third, and more specific to reverse engineering, limiting fair use in 
the initial years of a software program's term of protection could visit 
real harm on competitive markets for computer software. The fair use 
privilege for reverse engineering is necessary to prevent software pub­
lishers from using copyright to prevent competition in software mar­
kets.357 This competition is particularly important early in the life-cycle 
of computer software, partly because the life-cycle is so short, and 
partly because software markets are characterized by strong network 
effects.358 That is, software programs and platforms can become more 
valuable when used by more users since this enables users to easily 
transfer learned skills, permits them to easily share common document 
formats, and encourages development of valuable compatible pro­
grams.359 Because this state of affairs makes it possible for certain pro­
grams to become dominant, encouraging compatibility and competi­
tion is particularly important early in the lifecycle of these software 
markets, in order to foster real competition.360 
355. See LESSIG, supra note 121, at 252 ("Software is a special case. The current (term 
of] protection for software . . .  is a parody of the Constitution's requirement that copyright 
be for 'limited Times.' . . .  The term of copyright for software is effectively unlimited.''). 
356. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). 
357. See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Applica­
tion Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989). 
358. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, an4 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). See generally Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
359. See Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35 
(1989); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 
RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization 
Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (19%). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The 
Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. ECON. 1 (1990). 
360. See Menell, supra note 357. But see Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considera­
tions in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 346 (1995). 
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Thus, for the above reasons, the proposal in this Article is not ap­
plicable to cases involving reverse engineering of computer .software, 
largely because of the unique aspects of copyright protection of com­
puter software. Although the proposal in this Article would have sub­
stantial benefits when 11pplied to the vast majority of copyrightable 
works, it is important to acknowledge this one specific limitation on 
the scope of the proposal. 
B. Objections 
A number of objections could (and will likely) be raised against 
the proposal in this Article. One objection is that considering time as a 
factor in fair use analysis will only serve to make copyright entitle­
ments more uncertain. As a general matter, we prefer to have clear 
entitlements, since clarity reduces both the potential for, and the cost 
of, disputes.361 If entitlements are clear, parties will know what their 
rights are and thereby avoid infringement. And in the cases of in­
fringement that do occur, courts will be able to resolve the issue more 
expeditiously if a clear ·rule exists. Moreover, clarity facilitates effi­
ciency by lowering the costs of bargaining. Thus, one practical objec­
tion is that adding time to the mix merely muddies the water. 
As an initial matter, consideration of time would in fact add little 
·appreciable uncertainty beyond the levels that already exist in copy­
right law more generally. The fair use defense is notoriously uncertain 
in scope, since it already involves the case-by-case balancing of four 
statutory factors.362 Moreover, the Copyright Act itself expressly con­
templates the consideration of additional, unspecified fair use fac­
tors.363 The defense is already quite uncertain in scope, and the consid­
eration of an additional factor would add little marginal uncertainty. 
Indeed, the uncertainty is the cost associated with the great benefit of 
fair use analysis, its flexibility. And in giving courts a broad degree of 
discretion, Congress clearly made a policy choice in favor of flexibility, 
despite its costs. .. 
· 
In addition, the actual application of time as a factor would be 
relatively straightforward.364 Unlike many of the other factors, the con­
tent of this new factor would be absolutely clear. That is, the age of a 
361. See MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 
1989); Cooter & Ulen, supra note 136; Merges, supra note 341; Carol M. Rose, Crystals and 
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). But see Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for 
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999). 
362. Indeed, the fair use defense has famously been called "the most troublesome [is­
sue] in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 , 662 (2d 
Cir. 1939). 
363. See supra Section III.A. 
364. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10 (making same arguments). 
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work is a fact that can be objectively determined, artd that will rarely 
be the subject of dispute. The date Gone With the Wind was published 
is an established fact, easily discoverable and verifiable. This is not the 
case with all of the other fair use factors. For example, the impact on 
the market - arguably the most important factor - is notoriously dif­
ficult to quantify and subject to significant uncertainty,' particularly 
when dealing with markets for derivative works. Thus, the new factor 
has an advantage in that respect. 
Moreover, even the weight of this factor is relatively straightfor­
ward, insofar as it is a fairly simple sliding scale. The older the work, 
th� greater the scope of fair use. The consideration is essentially a bi­
nary one. Although it proceeds along a continuum, from recent to old, · 
from more protection to less, this is no different than any of the other 
factors. For example, works can be anywhere on the continuum be­
tween factual and creative, commercial or nonco,nmercial, transfor­
mative or non-transformative. Similarly the amount of the original ap­
propriated can vary from little to much, or anywhere in between. And 
at least in the instance of time, the factual predicate (that is, the num­
ber of years) is unambiguous. Thus, the application of the factor itself 
would not add much if any additional uncertainty. 
Finally, to the extent that consideration of this factor tips the scales 
in many cases, as in the Wind Done Gone case, it may in fact provide a 
clearer and simpler way of determining the scope of protection. That 
is, for older works, consideration of time might well make it easier for 
courts to reach their ultimate decision. True, in other cases considera­
tion of time might make what would otherwise be a clear case a closer 
case. The point, however, is that we cannot be sure ahead of time 
whether it would increase or decrease uncertainty. Thus, there is no 
indication that consideration of time would make fair use analysis 
more complex or indeterminate, particularly given that it is already ex-
tremely indeterminate.365 
· 
A second objection is that considering time is inappropriate be­
cause time acts as a proxy for other values, and these other values 
should be considered expressly: If time serves as a proxy for incen­
tives, a court should look directly at incentives. Or if time serves as a 
365. A related objection is that the proposal fosters a particular kind of uncertainty by 
making questions of fair use subject to reexamination, thus undermining a general interest in 
repose. That is, a defendant who lost a case could simply wait a number of years, then get a 
second bite at the apple. While it is true that cases might be open to reexamination after a 
number of years, the practical impact of this will likely be quite minimal. First, cases would 
only be open to examination after an appreciable number of years have passed, since the 
policy interests vindicated by the proposal are affected by passage of time measured in dec­
ades, not single years. Thus there is really little risk of fair use issues being re-litigated every 
few years. Second, to the extent that cases are re-litigated not years but decades later, this is 
a desirable feature of the proposal, not a drawback. That is, by permitting reexamination 
after many years have passed, the proposal serves the policy interests that have been offered 
in support of the proposal, since by then, the balance of such interests may well have shifted. 
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proxy for increased transactions costs, we should determine the scope 
of such costs directly, as courts sometimes already do. Or if time 
serves as a proxy for the cultural significance of a work, a court should 
look directly at that significance. Or if time serves as a proxy for the 
reward to authors, we should look directly at whether the reward is 
sufficient.366 By considering time independently, a court risks applying 
the factor in cases where it may not accurately reflect the true interest 
that we are seeking to vindicate. 
My response is that time is useful precisely because it serves as a 
proxy for all of the above considerations. Direct consideration of the 
interests above would in fact lead to much added complexity in fair 
use analysis, since assessment of the multiple factors above would be 
difficult and highly indeterminate.367 Whether an author deserves 
more compensation is not something that can easily be answered with 
any degree of precision.368 Similarly, the cultural significance of a 
work, although perhaps easier to determine, is fraught with the type of 
subjective cultural value judgments that courts in copyright cases pre­
fer to avoid.369 As I hope to have established above, however, time 
serves as a very good proxy for compensation to the author, for incen­
tives, for the costs of access, for the cultural significance of the work, 
and for other important policy justifications underlying copyright law 
generally. And it obviates the need to consider all of them at the same 
time. 
The proposal thus strikes a pragmatic balance by permitting con­
sideration of all of these interests without adding an unworkable 
amount of additional complexity. The challenge in proposing a doc­
trinal change, particularly to an area as confusing and indeterminate as 
fair use, is coming up with one that adds significant benefits without 
introducing too much in the way of costs, including costs associated 
with administrability. The proposal in this Article is already open to 
the criticism that it is making an already indeterminate issue even 
more indeterminate. As I have indicated above, I do not believe this 
to be the case. But it certainly would be the case if, instead of simply 
366. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1210-15 (proposing that courts expressly consider 
the amount of compensation that the author has received). 
367. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1215 (proposing express consideration of whether 
a work has achieved "iconic" status, although acknowledging that this determination may be 
difficult). 
368. Indeed, our copyright system is designed in many ways so that we can avoid ad­
dressing this question. Under our system, the "value" of a work is measured by the market, 
see Netanel, supra note 107, which may or may not correspond to social value, cultural 
importance, or desert to the author. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, 
supra note 4, at 144 {"In any case, copyright as a general matter is a poor vehicle for insuring 
'due rewards.' Economic success and cultural value do not perforce coincide . . . .  Nor is 
there any necessary correlation between this return and the moral deserts of the creator."). 
369. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). But see Alfred Yen, 
Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). 
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considering time as an additional factor, courts were instead asked to 
consider questions such as the cultural significance of a work or the 
appropriate amount of compensation deserved by an author. By using 
time as a proxy, the proposal permits consideration of many of the 
complicated underlying policy concerns in the context of a relatively 
easy-to-administer additional factor in fair use analysis.370 
Of course, time is not a perfect proxy for these underlying inter­
ests. For example, one could imagine a case where a painter toiled 
away in obscurity for much of his life, only to achieve fame well after 
his death in the last ten years of the copyright term. Under such cir­
cumstances, time is not an accurate measure of desert or of compensa­
tion.371 Similarly, many old works may have little or no cultural signifi­
cance, and thus not be desirable subjects for transformation or re­
imagination. Or take the question of transaction costs. Although in 
many cases, the age of a work may be correlated with costs associated 
with securing licenses, in other cases there may be no such correlation, 
for example where a work is still being actively licensed near the end 
of its copyright term. Thus there may well be cases where time does 
not perfectly reflect the underlying copyright interests. 
Time will be a good proxy in many cases, however, and the bene­
fits of considering time as an easy-to-administer mechanism for getting 
at these underlying interests is sufficient to justify its application as a 
general rule (though always subject to modification if exceptional cir­
cumstances arise). Indeed, many of the existing fair use factors are 
themselves proxies for underlying copyright interests. For example, 
the nature of the work, the amount copied, and the nature of the use 
are not themselves relevant copyright values. Instead, they serve as 
proxies for underlying values such as the potential harm to incentives, 
the societal benefits from the use, etc. Thus, even with the standard 
fair use factors, there may be situations where a given factor does not 
adequately serve as a proxy for underlying copyright values.372 Indeed, 
even the copyright term is a proxy, since it is always possible that a 
work may become commercially famous after the term of protection 
has expired. Despite these possibilities, we do not dismiss these con­
siderations since, by and large, they do a good job of approximating 
the values that we are concerned with. Such is the case with time. 
370. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 52 n.70 
(noting that varying term work-by-work, though perhaps theoretically optimal, would be 
administratively impossible, and suggesting fair use as an alternative measure of tailoring 
protection). 
371. Of course, the compensation in this example would go to the author's heirs, since 
he or she would be long dead by this time. 
372. See, e.g. , Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (dismissing the 
"nature of the work" factor and substantially qualifying the "amount copied" factor to adapt 
it to the case of parody); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (creatively 
interpreting the "amount copied," "commercial use," and "harm to market" factors to fit the 
peculiarities of reverse engineering). 
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A third objection is that the proposal in this Article is too vague 
and ill-defined to have an appreciable impact on the scope of fair 
use.373 Under this view, time will not contribute measurably to fair use 
analysis (beyond the extent to which it may or may not already be 
taken into account in the other factors) or make a difference in 
enough cases to make it worthwhile for courts to even engage in the 
analysis. As I hope I have shown above, however, the added cost of 
considering time is quite minimal, since the test for time is rather easy 
to administer. Moreover, as the examples above point out, considera­
tion of time could in fact lead to different results in an appreciable 
number of cases. 
True, the impact of time would be felt incrementally as courts ap­
ply the rule in a case-by-case fashion. The impact of this change would 
not be as dramatic as the invalidation of term extension, which would 
immediately affect a huge number of works, casting them clearly into 
the public domain. Instead, the impact of the proposal would develop 
over time, as parties adopt the argument in their briefs, as individual 
courts (hopefully) accept the argument, as third parties read and in­
ternalize the resulting decisions, and as these third parties change their 
behavior in response to the change in the law. However, in many ways, 
this is a strength of the proposal, since it permits courts to inject such 
considerations in a case-by-case fashion, to which courts are more ac­
customed. It permits courts to work out the implications of this change 
and to refine it as they apply it to specific cases. And over the long 
term, the impact of the change would be substantial, insofar as it 
would become clear that older works are subject to a greater scope of 
fair use. 
I expect that owners of valuable long-standing copyrights will have 
strong objections to the proposal in this Article. It's not hard to see 
why. The Disney corporation, for example, derives a tremendous 
amount of revenue from its copyrights in Mickey Mouse, Minnie 
Mouse, Donald Duck, Goofy, and the rest. The analysis in this Article 
suggests that Mickey should be subject to greater scope of fair use. Al­
though Disney might be upset at this prospect, the general public 
should be delighted. Mickey has already received more than seventy 
years of exclusive copyright protection and, on top of that, a twenty­
year reprieve under the copyright term extension act. Walt Disney and 
his descendants have been amply rewarded for Mr. Disney's original 
creative labor.374 No authors witnessing a slightly greater scope of fair 
373. Fair use can be an easy out for those who would like to see changes in the scope of 
copyright protection, insofar as it leaves to the courts the task of implementing proposed 
changes through exercise of their discretion, and does not require too much uncomfortable 
specificity in detailing such changes. In this case, however, the proposal is an extremely con­
crete one and would modify fair use analysis in a discrete and particular way. 
374. See Litman, supra note 304, at 431-32. 
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use of Mickey Mouse would be deterred from creative labor by the 
prospect of reduced incentives. The Disney corporation has had ample 
time to exploit and build upon the original cultural property. And now 
it's time for others to have a crack at Mickey. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that courts should consider time when de­
ciding whether a use is fair. The copyright act itself expressly permits 
courts to consider additional factors in fair use, and extremely strong 
policy justifications support such a consideration. By considering time 
as a factor in fair use analysis, courts can achieve a more finely-tuned 
balance of the various justifications underlying copyright law more 
generally, one that recognizes the impact of time on the proper scope 
of copyright protection. 
